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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Challenge
The Supreme Court agreed in November 2003 to hear a
challenge by two health maintenance organizations' (HMOs) to
lower court rulings 2 allowing injured patients and their families
to sue HMOs in state court for medical malpractice without being
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).3 The suits in state courts had been authorized
under a Texas statute, 4 similar to those passed in a number of
1 Aetna Health, Inc. and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas.
2 See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 311 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that ERISA
should not be interpreted to preempt state malpractice laws or to create federal common
law of medical malpractice); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002),
appeal docketed, No. 02-1845, www.supremecourtus.gov/ docket/02-1845.htm (showing
case on Supreme Court docket); CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc v. Calad, 307 F.3d 298
(5th Cir. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 03-83, www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-83.htm
(showing case on Supreme Court docket).
3 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001, (1974)
(declaring that Act is intended to protect interstate commerce and interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information, by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the federal courts); see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 U.S. 2488, 2492 (2004)
(reviewing decision of Fifth Circuit, stating claim was not preempted by ERISA); CIGNA
HealthCareof Texas Inc. v. Calad, 124 S. Ct. 1493, 1493 (2004) (hearing challenge to
lower court rulings); see also Supreme Court to Decide if HMOs May Be Sued in State
Court, LIAB. & INS. WEEK, Nov. 9, 2003, (noting underlying facts of companion cases and
quoting lower courts' holdings).
4 Texas was the first state in the nation to adopt legislation creating liability for
negligence in health care decisions made by health care providers. On September 1, 1997,
Senate Bill 386 (SB 386) became effective, amending Title 4 of the CIVIL PRACTICE AND
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other states, 5 allowing participants to bring negligence claims
6
against the companies if they are denied medically necessary
care. 7 Previously, circuit courts had continuously held that the
ERISA preemption clause8 shields employee-sponsored health
care plans from such claims based on state law. 9 The preemption
clause states that "the provisions of this title ...shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."lO
REMEDIES CODE by adding Chapter 88. Texas Health Care Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 88.001 - .003 (2004) and Organization of Insurers and Related Entities, TEX.
INS. CODE ANN., arts. 20A.09, 20A.12, 20A.12A, 21.58A, 21.58C (2004).
5 See e.g., Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
125/4-10 (2000). This act states that the statute requiring HMOs to submit to
independent physician review when there is disagreement between patient's primary care
physician and HMO over whether course of treatment is medically necessary is not
preempted by ERISA. Id. Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 208 F.Supp.2d 288, 294 (E.D.N.Y.
2001). Plaintiffs spouse sued their HMO after her husband died, following a medical
director's refusal to allow a procedure recommended by their physician. Id. See also
Karene M. Boos & Eric J. Boos, Killing The Fatted Calf: Managed Care Liability In A
Post-Pegram World, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003). The author discusses the
Wisconsin approach to facilitating plaintiffs' challenges, where rather than reforming
medical malpractice statutes, the state requires that medical directors be licensed
physicians, and, as such, they must carry medical malpractice insurance. This statutory
provision presupposes that medical directors are making use of their medical knowledge
when reviewing benefits decisions and therefore are acting as physicians who should be
subject to medical malpractice standards. Id.
6 See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.001 (2004) (defining "appropriate and
medically necessary" as standard for health care services as determined by physicians
and health care providers in accordance with prevailing practices and standards of
medical profession and community).
7 The Texas Health Care Liability Act authorizes an insured to sue an HMO, other
managed care entities or the managed care entity's employees and agents for damages
proximately caused by the failure to "exercise ordinary care when making health care
treatment decisions." See Act of May 22, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 163, 1997 TEX. GEN.
LAWS 317 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 88.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1999)
and TEX. INS. CODE ANN., arts. 20A.09, 20A. 12, 20A.12A, 21.58A, 21.58C (Vernon Supp.
1999)); see also Susan Borreson, Judge Oks Law Allowing HMO Malpractice Suits, Sept.
28, 1998, TEX. LAW., at 1 (1998); Tex. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). The author
discusses the changes made to TEX. INS. CODE ANN., arts. 20A, 21.58A & C as part of the
Act.
8 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (preempting injured patients from suing HMOs in state court).
9 See e.g., Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court
decision that claim was preempted by ERISA); Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, 245 F.3d
266, 278 (3rd Cir. 2001) (stating that suits against HMOs and insurance companies for
denial of benefits, even when couched in terms of common law negligence or breach of
contract, have been held to be preempted by ERISA); Tolton v. Biodyne Inc., 48 F.3d 937,
943 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding preemption); McManus v. Traveler's Health Network, 742
F. Supp 377, 379 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (explaining that preemption provision of ERISA is
expansive). But see Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 104 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that by
denying one treatment and authorizing another that decedent's doctor had not specifically
requested, medical director seemed to have been engaged in patient-specific proscription
of appropriate treatment, and, ultimately, medical decision regarding appropriate
treatment for decedent, which could implicate state law medical malpractice claim under
New York law).
10 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (discussing the preemptive effect of ERISA on state laws).
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This Article will examine the Supreme Court's previous rulings
in ERISA cases, specifically focusing on the doctrine of fiduciary
duty" and the application of the concept of "areas of traditional
state concern."1 2 Allowing patients' claims, under state statutes,
to be preempted by ERISA has left an enormous void in the
rights patients would have if they were not covered by an ERISA
plan.13 The federal court remedies provided by ERISA14 do not
address a problem that Congress not only created, arguably
intentionally,15 in order to alleviate the administrative burden of
11 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222 (2000). "Fiduciary" is described as someone
acting in the capacity of manager, administrator, or financial adviser. Id. Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996). ERISA requires fiduciary to discharge his duties with
respect to plan solely in interest of participants and beneficiaries. Id. Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993). Fiduciary's duties include the proper management,
administration, and investment of assets, the maintenance of proper records, the
disclosure of specified information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. Id. 29 USCS
§ 1109 (2004). ERISA allows a participant or beneficiary to sue under § 1109 for breach of
fiduciary duty. § 1109(a) states that "any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan
who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries
by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary." Id. •
12 See generally Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Traditional State Interests and
Constitutional Norms: Impressive Cases in Conventional Settings, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1245,
1283 (2001) (surveying variety of cases where "traditional state concern" is at issue,
subsequently noting federalist revival on Supreme Court and existing opportunity for
reinvented activism arising in conventional contexts).
13 See Suzanne Carter, Health Care and ERISA, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 561, 561
(1999) (advocating Patients' Bill of Rights that would hold HMOs accountable, contain
legal and medical costs and allow malpractice victims to be duly compensated); Jason A.
Glodt, Watch Out HMOs: The Future Of Patients'Rights Will Soon Be Determined,45 S.D.
L. REV. 640, 640 (2000) (explaining that patients are demanding accountability and want
right to sue their HMOs in state court, and, as a result, once-impermeable ERISA
preemption shield is under heavy fire from Congress, state legislatures and courts); see
also Tiffany F. Theodos, The Patients'Bill Of Rights: Women's Rights Under Managed
Care and ERISA Preemption, 26 AM. J.L. AND MED. 89, 90 (2000) (stating American
Medical Association strongly supports passage of Patients' Bill of Rights that would cover
all 161 million privately insured Americans, give patients stronger, wider range of rights
and allow patients to sue their health plans for damages in state courts if denial of care
results in injuries).
14 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132, § 1144. Federal remedies under ERISA includes
actions by the employee to recover the cost of denied benefits, enforcement of rights under
the policy, clarification of rights to future benefits, damages for breach of fiduciary duty or
an injunction to halt unfair practices by the ERISA provider. Under ERISA's remedial
scheme, a plan participant cannot recover for personal injury, lost wages or punitive
damages. Id.
15 120 CONG. REC. 29197, 29933 (1974). Statement by bill sponsor, Senator Williams:
[1It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the
substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or
inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is
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complying with a vast multitude of different state laws 16 as
explained in PART III, but has since failed to remedy.17 Without
any far-reaching congressional action addressing this issue of
vast constitutional magnitude, it remains in the hands of the
Supreme Court to decide whether the Fifth Circuit has properly
applied the Supreme Court's oft-confusing, and hotly debated,
prior holdings.iS It is the purpose of this Article to formulate a
navigable and concise path through ERISA legislation and case
law,19 supporting the theory that the preemption clause of
ERISA should have no bearing on state legislation allowing
2
patients to hold their managed care organizations (MCOs) 0
intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or
any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.
Id. See also Aetna Health, 124 U.S. at 2495. Congress enacted ERISA to protect interests
of participants by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit
plans and to provide for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to the federal
courts. Id. Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985). Congress desired to
create uniform federal law governing enforcement of ERISA. Id.
16 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745-46 (1985)
(setting forth legislative history of ERISA's preemption provision); see also Stott v. Bunge
Corp. & Beatrice Co., 800 F Supp. 567, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (declaring general rule that
state law claims are preempted by ERISA); Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New
Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA Pre-Emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255, 269
(Winter 1996) (stating Mackey holding reflects Court's practical approach to assessing
congressional intent regarding the scope of ERISA preemption).
17 See, e.g., Morton Kondracke,
Underachieving Congress Will Eventually
Compromise, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 20, 2002 at B3 (arguing that "[plrobably the starkest
area of failure is in the health field... the lawyer issue has torpedoed patients' rights
legislation"); Robert Pear, White House and Senate Hit Impasse on Patients'Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A17 (citing collapse of talks between White House and Senate on a
bill to define patients' rights); see also Thomas R. McLean and Edward P. Richards, The
'Aetna Health' Ruling, NATIONAL L.J., Aug. 30, 2004, at 12 (stating that Court could
broaden ERISA remedies, but that health policy choices should be made by Congress).
18 See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (expressing doubt
that one of Congress' goals in passing ERISA was to put medical judgments in hands of
plan administrators instead of doctors); see also Lorraine Schmall and Brenda Stephens,
ERISA Preemption: A Move Towards Defederalizing Claims For Patients' Rights, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 529, 549 (Spring 2004) (explaining that, in Roark, Fifth Circuit stated that
it was "unimaginable that Congress intended ERISA to create a federal common law
medical malpractice"). But see Matthew J. Binette, Patients' Bill of Rights: Legislative
Cure-All or Prescriptionfor Disaster? 81 N.C. L. REV. 653, 689 (January 2003) (stating
that action in federal courts or Congress could drastically change state patient protection
acts, positively or negatively).
19 It is outside the scope of this Article to discuss the entirety of earlier ERISA
litigation or the development and subsequent judicial treatment of any number of theories
of liability, particularly the vast array of lower level federal court decisions. It is
sufficient to note, for the purpose of this Article, that the large majority of lower courts
have consistently held that the administrator of an ERISA health care plan was a
fiduciary, but that health care service providers, such as physicians and hospitals, were
not. See, e.g., William E. Mattingly, Employer Liability for a Medical Plan, 16 TAX MGMT.
COMP. PLANNING J. 159 (1989).
20 Blaire S. Osgood, The Treachery of ERISA Preemption: Ceci N'est Pas une Benefits
Determination, 81 B.U. L. REV. 867, 892 (October 2001) (arguing that in order to bring
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responsible for negligent coverage decisions via state common
law tort and breach of contract actions. 21
B. ConstitutionalPreemption
Where Congress exercises a granted power, federal law
supersedes 22 a conflicting state law and preempts state authority
over the subject matter by the operation of the Supremacy
Clause 2 3 of the United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause 2
of the Constitution 24 states that all laws made by Congress in
pursuance of the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."2 5 Congress has virtually unfettered authority to preempt
state power to regulate a certain subject matter through express
preemption, field preemption or conflict preemption. 26 Congress
federal legislation up to date with state legislation, ERISA's preemption provision should
not be interpreted to include state regulation of practice of medicine, including judgments
made by all MCO medical directors); see also Phyllis C. Borzi, The Evolving Role of ERISA
Preemption and Managed Care: Current Issues of Importance to Employers, Fiduciaries
and Providers, Q286 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 17, 19 (1999) (noting that U.S. Department of Labor
statistics reveal that 72 percent of workforce, nearly two-thirds of entire non-elderly
population, is covered under group health plans subject to ERISA); Heather Hutchinson,
The Managed Care Plan Accountability Act, 32 IND. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (1999)
(determining managed care is experiencing widespread growth across United States with
more than 45 million Americans enrolled in managed care organizations, and pointing to
escalating number of Americans affected by MCOs, and their administration of
healthcare, as more than 70 percent of American workers and their families covered by
managed care health plans).
21 See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (holding that
ERISA doesn't preempt "run of the mill state law claims"). But see, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (concerning Mississippi common law breach of contract and
tort claims held to be preempted by ERISA). Cf. Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.
N.J. 1994) (concluding that ERISA "preempts state law tort claims brought against an
HMO for the negligence of one of its participating physicians...").
22 Arizona v. McMurry, 184 Ariz. 447, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (listing six situations
in which federal law may preclude state law, including when state law is an obstacle to
the accomplishment of full objectives of Congress); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
746-47 (1981) (explaining that purpose to displace state law may be demonstrated when
state policy might produce a result that is inconsistent with federal statute); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819) (declaring that constitutional command
of Supremacy Clause requires all state provisions in conflict with Federal law to be
without effect).
23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
24 Id.
25 Article VI, § 1, cl. 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
26 See Hughes v. AG of Florida, 377 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that
Supreme Court has defined three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict); Cliff v.
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may structure a federal law to govern a cause of action ("conflict
preemption"), or it may structure a federal law to "occupy the
27
field" in which causes may arise ("complete preemption").
Congress will only articulate an express intent to completely
preempt state law in a certain area when it has a "clear and
manifest purpose" for infringing upon the traditional police
powers of the states. 28
When Congress incorporates a statement into a federal statute
that expressly preempts state action, the only remaining issue
for judicial review is whether the state statute falls within the
area preempted.2 9 The crux of an implied preemption case is
whether Congress intended to occupy the regulatory field,30
Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing three
types of preemption, one express and two types of implied); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted) (defining three types of preemption as
follows: "The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the state policy may produce a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute").
27 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (explaining difference between
field preemption and conflicting preemption); Boos, supra note 5, at 71 (explaining that,
historically, Congress rarely articulates express intent to preempt state law because it
does not want to interfere with state police powers without manifest purpose). See
generally S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civil Republic Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 687, 694 (1991) (describing effects of federal preemption ruling as revoking local
power and affirming that only federal government may exercise that power).
28 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (listing several ways in which intention to preempt may be
evidenced, including regulation being so insidious that it can be reasonably inferred that
Congress left no room for states to legislate it, and act of Congress being in a field where
federal legislation is so dominant that it is assumed to preclude state laws on that
subject); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)
(citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., for proposition that preemption will not be assumed
without a clear manifestation of intent by Congress); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977) (explaining that reasoning behind requiring manifest purpose is to ensure
separation of powers between state and federal government not disturbed).
29 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (assessing whether a
federal statute expressly preempts a state law claim by determining whether federal
statute explicitly articulates an intent to displace state regulation). See generally,
Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1267 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that express provisions in statute preempting state law illustrate that
Congress did not preempt state law in any other matters than those addressed); Michael
J. Jackonis Jr., Considerationsin Medicare Reform: The Impact of Medicare Preemption
on State Laws, 29 ANN. HEALTH L. 179, 196 (Winter 2004) (distinguishing judicial role in
interpretation of express and implied preemption).
30 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (examining
explicit statutory language and structure and purpose of statute to discern Congress'
intent); Cipollone 505 U.S. at 516 (stating that congressional intent can be determined by
examining statute's structure and purpose); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91,
98 (1992) (noting importance of maintaining state sovereignty).
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which requires a clear showing of congressional intent. 3 1 Even
where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a
specific area, "state law is pre-empted to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law." 32 A subsequent federal
preemption ruling revokes state and local governmental power
over the subject matter and effectively affirms that such power
33
may be exercised solely by the national government.
II. ERISA AND THE

SUPREME COURT

The foremost task of a court tackling a preemption case is to
"ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at
issue." 34 The plain language of ERISA, its legislative history and
the context in which it was enacted 35 have all been taken into
entirely different
account by various courts reaching
36
conclusions. The stated purpose of ERISA's preemption clause
31 See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (stating that states' powers cannot be superceded unless
it is clear purpose of Congress); Napier v. Atlantic Coast R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)
(explaining that Congress' intent to preempt must be clearly manifested); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) (holding that Congress' intent to supercede cannot be
implied without clear evidence of purpose).
32 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 182 (1983) (quoting Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (stating further that "[s]uch a conflict arises when 'compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' or where state law 'stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"').
33 See Kurt Chadwell, Automobile Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone:An End to
the Federal Preemption Defense, 46 BAYLOR L. REV 141, 151 (1994) (stating that
preemption indicates congressional intent to close an area of law to state regulation );
Jason Crawford, Overcoming Tobacco Immunity: Cipollone Clears an Uncertain Path, 27
GA. L. REV. 253, 267 (1992) (stating that allowance of federal regulations to supercede
state law without clear congressional intent creates "regulatory vacuum");Hoke, supra
note 27, at 694-95 (discussing regulatory vacuum that may exist if questions have not
been addressed by national legislation or agency regulations and is not on current
national political agenda).
34 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
35 See, e.g., Hines 312 U.S. at 62, 66 (creating inferred intent based on surrounding
circumstances, namely dominance of federal interest in foreign affairs because "the
supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs ... is made clear by
the Constitution," and regulation of that field is "intimately blended and intertwined with
responsibilities of the national government"); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536
U.S. 355, 364-65 (2002) (reasoning that when "ordinary language" of statute appears
uncertain, it must be examined with qualification that historic police powers of states are
not to be displaced without clear congressional intent); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) (finding that preemption and savings
clauses of ERISA "are not models of legislative drafting" and, further, that legislative
history is sparse).
36 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67 (1987) (noting that, though
suit purported to raise only state law claims, ERISA superceded state law regarding
benefit plans in this case); Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 311 (5th Cir. 2002)
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was to "enhance the ability of participants and beneficiaries to
enforce their rights to their promised ERISA benefits and to set
baseline rules by which to measure the conduct of plan sponsors
and fiduciaries." 37 The specific language of ERISA that has
required such an inordinate amount of judicial interpretation
states: "the provisions of this title ... shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
38
employee benefit plan."

The 'related to' language was initially interpreted in a broad,
almost sweeping, manner by the courts. 39 In 1983, the Supreme
Court defined 'relate to' (and therefore preempted) as having "a
connection with or reference to such a plan."40 If the state law in
question has no connection with or reference to an ERISA plan,
the claim will not be preempted and will be adjudicated in state
court under the applicable statute. 4 1

(stating that ERISA does not preempt state malpractice laws); see also N.Y.S. Conf. Of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)
(questioning whether plain language of ERISA provides for any real limits to its
preemptive power).
37 JANE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION, 282 (2003); see
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (noting congressional objective of establishment of "nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans," heralding that goal as "basic thrust of
the preemption clause"). See generally RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 173-77 (1997) (analyzing legislative history and policy
significance of ERISA preemption).
38 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
39 See ZANGLEIN, supra note 37, at 282 (acknowledging that early U.S. Supreme
Court decisions applied literal interpretation of 'relate to' language in § 514, resulting in
substantial weakening of right of participants and beneficiaries to sue ERISA plan); see
also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (discussing broad and "common
sense" meaning that Supreme Court has given to phrase 'relates to,' and interpreting it to
include state law that has any connection or reference to a plan); Shaw 463 U.S. at 98
(stating that committees found that scope of ERISA was as broad as its language
suggests).
40 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97.
41 See Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 161-62 (3rd Cir. 1999) (noting
that claims against quality of care are not subject to complete preemption); Shaw, 463
U.S. at 100 n.1 (stating that "[slome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan"); Jacqueline B. Penrod, Rationing Health Care, Rationing Liability - Imposing
Liability Against Health Maintenance Organizations Through State Legislation, 74
TEMPLE L. REV. 507, 519-24 (Summer 2001) (discussing various cases remanded from
federal to state courts).
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The "Connection With" Test

To determine whether a state law has "the forbidden
connection," 42 we look to "the objectives of the ERISA statute as a
guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive."43 This focus on intent did not originate in the
recent decisions this Article concentrates on, but is instead found
in the entirety of healthcare-related ERISA case law, starting
with Shaw v. Delta Air Lines.4 4 Laws that "plainly order the

administration of employee benefit structures" 45 have the
requisite connection discussed and are immediately preempted. 46
In New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co.,47 Justice Souter explicitly narrowed the effect

of the Court's earlier decisions, 4 8 which had found that even state
laws that indirectly affect employee benefit plans have a
sufficient connection with ERISA and are thereafter
preempted. 49 This landmark holding narrowed the scope of prior
42 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (quoting N.YS. Conf. Of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.).
43 Id.
44 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
The Shaw court held that two state laws prohibiting
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and requiring employers to provide sick leave
to employees disabled by pregnancy fell within ERISA's "relate to" language. Id at 108-09.
As a matter of course, the Court held that the meaning of the phrase "relates to" is
unambiguous and that it necessarily requires broad preemption. Id at 98-99.
45 ZANGLEIN, supra note 37, at 288.
46 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 (stating that Court must "give effect to this plain
language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have
some more restrictive meaning"); see also Patricia Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care
Organizations Manage to Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to
ERISA's Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 597 (2001) (citing
Travelers, noting holding that state law was not related to an employee benefit plan
because it did not make any specific reference to ERISA plans and because its "connection
with" employee benefit plans was not such that would disrupt uniform federally
administered employee benefit plan); Varr v. Olimpia, 45 Cal. App. 4th 675, 681 (6th Dist.
1996) (noting that "state law is preempted by ERISA so long as it has connection with or
reference to employee benefit plan").
47 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (discussing pre-emption provision of ERISA).
48 See e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (holding
state statutes in question, though creating only an indirect infringement, constituted
impermissible intrusion on federal regulatory scheme); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (stating that, "even if the law is not specifically designed to affect
such plans, or the effect is only indirect," preemption will occur); cf. Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, C.W. & H. v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959) (holding that when federal law
operates in "area where its authority is paramount, to leave the parties free, the
inconsistent application of state law is necessarily outside the power of the state").
49 Compare Travelers, 514 U.S. 645 (changing rule regarding indirect state action)
with Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525 (stating "even indirect state action bearing on private
pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern" and therefore fall
within the "relate to" provision of ERISA). See Scotti v. Los Robles Reg'l Ctr., 117 F.
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ERISA interpretation, 50 by reasoning that infinite connections
would stretch preemption in ways unintended by Congress,51
noting that "relations stop nowhere"52 and that this approach
characterized by limitless "indeterminacy" would fail completely
as the measure of preemption. 53
B. The "Reference To" Test
Laws that "act immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans,
or schemes where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the
law's operation," 54 have been held by the Supreme Court to have
"reference to" 5 5 ERISA so as to be preempted. If and when such
a law is capable of functioning "irrespective of the existence of an
ERISA plan," it is not subject to preemption. 56 The Traveler's line
Supp.2d 982, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that "a direct relationship to a plan need not be
established because an indirect relation to a plan is sufficient to establish preemption")
(citationsomitted).
50 See e.g., California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S.
316, 325 (1997) (describing the 'connection with' analysis, where a court 'looks both to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress
understood would survive, as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans") (citations omitted); see Lyons v. Fairfax Props., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17615, *8
(D. Conn. 2002) (explaining that "to overcome the anti-preemption presumption, a party
challenging a statute must convince a court that there is something in the practical
operation of the challenged statute to indicate that it is the type of law that Congress
specifically aimed to have ERISA supersede"); cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating assumption "that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress").
51 See ROSENBLATT, supra note 37 (discussing congressional intent in enacting
ERISA); Wright Elec., Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Elec., 322 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S at 655) (noting that "although the 'governing text of ERISA is
clearly expansive[,] ... if 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course"');
cf. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (arguing ERISA was intended to increase employee rights in
pension and benefit plans and to ease regulatory burden on employers by replacing all
state laws relating to pension and benefit plans with new federal law).
52 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (explaining why infinite connections stop nowhere).
53 See id. (noting that it is "necessary to recognize that [the Court's] prior attempt to
construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give [them] much help drawing the line [in this
case]"); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 235, 237
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting that Travelers has exemplified difficulties of divining proper scope
of preemption from such broad-brush language); cf. Morstein v. Nat'l Ins. Servs. Inc., 93
F.3d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that Travelers "essentially turned the tide on the
expansion of the preemption doctrine").
54 See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325.
55 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 n.16 (1983) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)) (defining "Relate: 'To stand in some relation; to have
bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with"').
56 See Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating
that "the mere existence of a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) is not enough for preemption," and further noting that "the state law
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of cases, 5 7 although drastically altering the "connection with"
prong of the "relates to" test,58 as illustrated above, retained the
Shaw court's interpretation of "reference to." 59 However, in a
separate line of cases 60 following the Supreme Court's decision in
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,6 1 federal courts ruled that
ERISA provided exclusive remedies for employer violation of plan
requirements 62 and preempted state causes of action in tort for
in question must make reference to or function with respect to the ERISA plan in order
for preemption to occur") (citations omitted); see also United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Grove, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1132 (D. Nev. 2000) (stating that "if state law has only 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral'
connection with covered plans, as is with many laws of general applicability, preemption
will not occur"); cf. Carpenter v. CNA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25264 at *1, *6 (D. Ohio
2001) (stating "the traditional rule of preemption is that where it is arguable that a
federal law preempts a state law, that argument is properly raised as a defense to the
state cause of action, in state court").
57 See e.g., Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 321 F.3d 83, 94 (2nd Cir. 2003) (explaining that
"where a State's law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans ... or where the
existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation ...that 'reference' will result
in pre-emption," noting that state laws invoked by Ms. Cicio, such as that respecting
medical malpractice doctrine, act neither immediately nor exclusively on ERISA plans
and because such plans are not "essential to" law's operation) (citations omitted);
CaliforniaDiv. of Labor Stds. Enforcement, 519 U.S. at 325 (noting that court must look
both to general objectives of ERISA statute and to effect of state law in question on
ERISA plans) (internal citations omitted); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001)
(acknowledging that 'connection with' is scarcely more restrictive than 'relate to,' and
cautioning "against an 'uncritical literalism' that would make preemption turn on 'infinite
connections"').
58 See N.Y.S. Conf. Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655-56 (1995) (noting that "Section 514(a) [currently § 1144] marks for pre-emption
,all state laws insofar as they ...relate to any employee benefit plan' covered by ERISA,
and one might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether words of limitation
('insofar as they.., relate') do much limiting"); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (noting that "a
law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan"); see also Ochmann, supra note 46, at 583
(noting that Justice Souter reformulated "relate to" analysis as used in Shaw).
59 See Blaine Hummel, The Duty of Ordinary Care for HMOs: Can Texas Senate Bill
386 Weather the Storm of ERISA Preemption?, 18 REV. LITIG. 649, 659 (Summer 1999)
(pointing out that from its discussion of "reference to" up until "connection with" analysis
in Travelers, Court remained faithful to Shaw analysis of which state laws might "relate
to" an employee benefit plan).
60 See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that "moreover, allowing the Corcorans' suit to go forward would contravene
Congress' goals of 'ensuring that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform
body of benefit law' and 'minimizing the administrative and financial burdens of
complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal
Government"'); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicating that "where
the state law has the effect of creating a qualitative standard ... by which the
performance of the contract is evaluated, then that state law is completely preempted");
see also Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting as
preempted malpractice claim against utilization review decision because defendants
"were determining what benefits were available ... under the plan").
61 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
62 See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 392 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)) (comparing
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negligence and bad faith breach of contract against employee
welfare benefit plans and the commercial insurers that funded
these plans.63 The Court concluded that a plan participant or
beneficiary may recover benefits under the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 1132(a). 64
C. The Savings Clause
The plaintiffs in these
claims against insurance
coverage decisions, proffer
preempted, based on

cases, who bring medical malpractice
companies based on their negligent
the argument that their claims are not
ERISA's savings clause. 6 5 ERISA

Illinois statute contested in Rush with Texas' tort of wrongful discharge at issue in
Ingersoll-Rand, which was held to have conflicted with ERISA enforcement because,
while state law duplicated elements of claim available under ERISA, it converted remedy
from equitable one into legal one); Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11779 at *1, *17 (2003) (stating that "when beneficiaries seek to recover benefits
from a plan covered by ERISA, their exclusive remedy is provided by ERISA"); see also
Stephanie Reinhart, Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran: 21 or Bust! Does ERISA
Preemption Give HMOs the power to gamble with our health? 19 AKRON TAX J. 99, 143
(2004) (noting that Pennsylvania federal court held Pennsylvania statute "preempted by
virtue of ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme").
63 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping And Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health
Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 335, 376 (2000) (discussing Pilot Life's expansive interpretation
of preemption clause and subsequent supporting case law). See generally Amy K. Fehn,
Are We Protected From HMO Negligence?: An Examination of Ohio Law, ERISA
Preemption and Legislative Initiatives, 30 AKRON L. REV. 501, 516 (1997) (observing that
"ERISA's preemption provisions bar state courts and legislatures from holding HMOs
liable for negligence"); Ochmann, supra note 46, at 588 (stating that "ERISA preemption
harms individuals by largely shielding MCOs from negligence liability").
64 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53 (1987) (asserting that "under the
civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to
recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or
to clarify rights to future benefits" and further that "[rielief may take the form of accrued
benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a
plan administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits"); Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d
630, 631-32 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing that ERISA § 1132(a), formerly ERISA § 502(a),
provides remedy for "participants or beneficiaries seeking to enforce their rights under an
ERISA plan"); see also Thompson v. Abbott Labs, 309 F. Supp. 2d 165, 171 (D. Mass.
2004) (stating that ERISA § 1132 authorizes participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries to
bring civil actions to redress violations of ERISA or to enforce any provisions of ERISA or
ERISA plan). See generally ZANGLEIN, supra note 37, at 68 (stating that ERISA § 502(a)
[currently ERISA § 1132(a)] creates civil cause of action to recover benefits, to enforce
rights under plan or to clarify rights to future benefits under terms of plan and allows
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary to bring suit to enjoin any act or practice that violates
Title I of ERISA, to obtain appropriate equitable relief or to enforce the terms of the plan).
65 See J. Bradley Buckhalter, Comment, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice
Claims: Can Managed Care OrganizationsAvoid Vicarious Liability?, 22 Seattle Univ. L.
Rev. 1165, 1165-1167 (1999) (addressing dilemma that faces plaintiffs when they file in
state court, expecting state court malpractice trial before state jury, and then face
removal to federal court by defendants); see also Douglas J. Witten, Regulation of
'Downstream" and Direct Risk Contracting by Health Care Providers: The Quest for
Consumer Protection and a Level Playing Field, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 449, 464 (1997)
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§1144(b)(2)(A) states that "nothing in this title shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking or securities." 66 The savings clause
is qualified by the "deemer clause" which follows, stating in
ERISA §1144(b)(2)(B), that "[n]either an employee benefit
plan.. .nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company.. .for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
67
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies."
The Court in Pilot Life addressed the plaintiffs assertion that
because the 'Mississippi law of bad faith ...is a law 'which
regulates insurance,' it is thus saved from pre-emption by §
514(b)(2)(A) [currently § 1144(b)(2)(A)]."68 Mississippi law of bad
faith "regulated insurers," 69 such as the defendant, 70 and they
were thus spared preemption. 7 1 However, the Court construed
the ERISA preemption clause much more broadly than it
construed the savings clause, 72 determining that in order for a
(stating that "the savings clause of ERISA exempts from preemption [state laws
regulating] insurance"). But see FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (analyzing
ERISA's "deemer" clause which provides exception to the savings clause).
66 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A).
67 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B).
68 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).
69 Torrin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent Selection and
Retention of Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 383, 402 (1995) (stating
that state laws regulating insurance are exempt from preemption); see Thomas R. McLean
& Edward P. Richards, Health Care's "Thirty Years War" The Origins and Dissolutionof
Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 311 (2004) (stating that state law that is
specifically targeted toward entities engaged in insurance, and that substantially affect
risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured, is saved from ERISA preemption);
see also Witten, supra note 65, at 464 (stating that "the saving clause of ERISA exempts
from preemption [state laws regulating insurance]").
70 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43 (stating that plaintiff relied on state law claims to
receive disability benefits from defendant Pilot Life Insurance Company instead of claims
that were available to him under ERISA).
71 Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication of Judicial Law Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 385 (1994) (stating
that Supreme Court "held that the plaintiffs state law claim under the Mississippi law of
bad faith was preempted"); Michael J. Jacksonis, Jr., Considerationsin Medicare Reform:
The Impact of Medicare Preemption on State Laws, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 179, 214 (2004)
(noting that Supreme Court denied plaintiffs state law claims of bad faith breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud on ground of preemption); see also Howard
Shapiro, Rene E. Thorne & Edward F. Harold, To Infinity and Beyond and Back Again?:
A Historical Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 58 LA. L. REV. 997, 1008 (1998)
(hereinafter To Infinity) (comprehensively analyzing facts of Pilot Life and the Court's
reasoning for holding plaintiffs claim was not spared preemption by savings clause).
72 McLean, et al., supra note 69, at 311 (stating that state law that is specifically
targeted toward entities engaged in insurance is saved from ERISA preemption); see
Reinhart, supra note 62, at 110-12 (discussing factors that must be met by state law to
avoid preemption); see also Dennis K. Schaeffer, Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan
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state law to be spared preemption, it must not simply have an
impact on the insurance industry, but "must be specifically
directed toward that industry." 73 Even state laws of generally
applicability 74 were deemed preempted and outside the scope of
the now narrowed savings clause by the holding in Pilot Life.75
Because the "roots -of the law of bad faith were firmly planted
in the general principles of tort and contract law," 76 and not
limited to breach of an insurance contract, the Court determined
the law did not regulate insurance 7 7 within the meaning of the
78
saving clause.

D. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court, in this series of rulings after the passage
of ERISA, made it seemingly clear that states were not permitted
to exercise any authority in the course of regulating employersponsored health plans. 79 However, two recent cases have
Participants:ERISA Preemption and the Federal Government's Duty To Regulate SelfInsured Health Plans, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1085, 1098 (1999) (noting Court's narrow
interpretation of savings clause as applicable only when laws were "specifically directed
toward [the insurance] industry").
73 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50.
74 Scott W. Breedlove & Victoria S. Salzmann, The Devil made me do it: The
Irrelevance of Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REV.
419, 453 (2001) (noting that criminal laws are generally applicable); Paul Hayden,
Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: International Infliction of Emotional
Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's Faiths", 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 580, 677
(1993) (stating that tort laws are "generally applicable laws"); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Cyberage Conflicts Law: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, The First
Amendment and Internet Speech: Notes for the next Yahoo! v. Licra, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.
697, 702 (2003) (describing contract law as generally applicable law).
75 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48 (holding that plaintiffs claims of tort and breach of
contract under Mississippi common law for petitioner's failure to pay benefits under policy
were preempted by ERISA).
76 Id.
77 See id. at 45 (holding "saving clause" excepts laws that regulate insurance from
preemption); see also McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1012(b) (requiring that
business of insurance be subject to state regulation, and, subject to certain exceptions,
mandating that no Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate any law enacted by
any state for purpose of regulating business of insurance).
78 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (holding that "understanding of the phrase 'regulates
insurance' does not support the argument that the Mississippi law of bad faith falls under
the saving clause"); see also Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with
Good Intentions:Problems and Potentialfor Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under
ERISA, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 56 (1999) (noting Court's holding that "in order to
regulate insurance within the requirements of the clause, the law must not only have an
impact on insurance, but must also be specifically directed toward insurance").
79 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (holding that enforcement of provisions eliminated
threat of conflicting or inconsistent state regulation of employee benefit plans). See
generally Nicole Weisenborn, ERISA Preemption and its Effect on State Reform, 5 KAN.
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ostensibly tilted the scales of preemption litigation in favor of
injured plaintiffs, and away from the MCOs hoping to perpetuate
their string of preemption successes.8 0 The Supreme Court's
analyses in Pegram v. Herdrich8l and Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran8 2 indicate a willingness to limit the formerly
sweeping breadth of ERISA's preemption clause.8 3

J.L. & PUB. POLY 147, 147 (Fall 1995) (claiming that ERISA regulates financing, vesting
and administration of private employee benefit plans); Barbara J. Zabawa, Breaking
through the ERISA Blockade: The Ability of States to Access Employer Health Plan
Information In Medicaid Expansion Initiatives, 5 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1, 12 (2001)
(stating that ERISA generally preempts state laws that relate to any employee benefit
plans).
80 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that "mixed eligibility
decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA"); Rush Prudential
HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (finding Illinois statute not subject to preemption,
Court noted, "that regulating insurance tied to what is medically necessary is probably
inseparable from enforcing the quintessentially state-law standards of reasonable medical
care"). See generally Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339-40 (2003)
(stating that use of McCarran-Ferguson case law in ERISA context had "misdirected
attention, failed to provide clear guidance to lower federal courts, and, as this case
demonstrates, added little to the relevant analysis").
81 See Pegram 530 U.S., at 215-16. Cynthia Herdrich sued under a negligence theory
to recover for injuries that her MCO allegedly caused by her physician's failure to order
an ultrasound that would have revealed appendicitis. Id. Her physician had scheduled her
ultrasound at an MCO-affiliated facility that was less expensive, yet further away than
the local hospital. Id. Herdrich claimed that the third-party administrator, a physicianowned MCO, failed to provide medically necessary treatment and thereby breached its
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Id.
82 See Rush, 536 U.S., at 360-61, 386-91. Moran suffered a shoulder affliction for
which her primary care physician recommended an unconventional treatment by a
specialist not affiliated with Rush HMO. Id at 360. Her request for coverage was denied
on the grounds that it was not medically necessary. Id. The Court subsequently held that
the Illinois act entitling her to exercise her right to an independent external review of
Rush's finding that the requested surgery was not medically necessary, regulates
insurance under the common sense test because it is directed at HMOs that perform the
essential function of the insurance business-underwriting and spreading risk among its
participants. Id at 386-87. Justice Thomas noted in his dissenting opinion that the
insurer's decision to deny benefits to the plaintiff in this case was entirely informed,
consulting numerous other physicians and literature. Id at 390-91.
83 See Christine Flood, Supreme Court Holds ERISA Does Not Preempt Illinois
Independent Review Law--Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 509,
512-13 (2002) (stating that "the Moran decision marks a victory for states in their attempt
to regulate HMOs and protect patients' rights without running afoul of ERISA"); Thomas
R. McLean, M.D. & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability for
Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2001) (stating that Pegram
ratifies view that "ERISA's preemption shield is not available for administrative
malfeasance in the delivery of health care"); Jackonis, supra note 29, at 216-17 (noting
that Pegram partially exposed MCOs to state law malpractice claims while Moran
clarified status of HMOs as both health care providers and insurers).
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1. Pegram v. Herdich
The Supreme Court held, in part, in Pegram that mixed
eligibility decisions - those that are both medical and
administrative - by health maintenance organization physicians
are not fiduciary decisions8 4 under ERISA,85 and thus are not
preempted.
As Justice Souter explained on behalf of the
unanimous Pegram Court, the threshold question the court must
address is whether the "person employed to provide services
under a plan.. .was acting as a fiduciary when taking the action
subject to complaint."8 6 Claims of breach of fiduciary duty are
88
traditionally preempted.8 7 This creates a regulatory vacuum
where claims in state law tort and contract actions are
preempted by ERISA when the preemption clause is interpreted
broadly,8 9 yet they are limited if any available remedies under

84 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217 (holding that "mixed eligibility decisions by HMO
physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA"). But see Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.,
508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993) (finding that anyone "who exercises discretionary control or
authority over the plan's management, administration, or assets.. .is an ERISA
fiduciary"); Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (holding fiduciaries may be liable to
plan participants or managed care enrollees for coverage decisions and selection and
monitoring of members of the provider network).
85 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237 (holding that Herdrich's mixed administrative ERISA
complaint fails to state ERISA claim).
86 Id. at 226.
87 See Smith v. Provident Bank, 170 F.3d 609, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1999) (preempting
claim for fiduciary breach but allowing claims against non-fiduciaries); Kramer v. Smith
Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that ERISA requires fiduciaries to
discharge their duties solely in interest of participants and beneficiaries, using care, skill,
prudence and diligence, and provides civil enforcement remedies for breach of such duty);
see also Rutledge v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th
Cir. 2000), opinion amended, 208 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992
(2000) (holding that state law claims alleging excessive fees are preempted because
receipt of such fees would constitute a prohibited transaction).
88 See Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1986 (1996) (discussing ERISA's
lack of substantive regulation and obstruction of certain state regulation); see also Flood,
supra note 83, at 512 (noting that "ERISA's lack of substantive regulation, coupled with
broad preemption of state laws, relegates ERISA plans to a regulatory vacuum"). See
generally Dawn Marie Kelly, The Effect of Pegram v. Herdrich on HMO Liability, 17
TOURO L. REV. 841, 852 (Summer 2001) (stating that Supreme Court utilized two-part test
to determine whether state law was intended to be preempted by ERISA).
89 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1987) (discussing
claims brought by petitioner under Mississippi common law tort and breach of contract
theories). See generally Kelly, supra note 88, at 851 (stating that Congress used language
that can be interpreted to connect almost any law to employee benefit plan); Heather E.
Rochet, Trilogy of Cases Narrow Scope of ERISA Preemption: Survival of State Law
Claims Regarding Negligent Quality of Care Under ERISA Plans in Light of Travelers,
Dukes, and Herdrich, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 827, 834 (Spring 2002) (claiming that preemption
clause was originally construed broadly by Supreme Court).
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ERISA are for non-fiduciaries. 90 By holding that "mixed
eligibility decisions" 91 by medical directors are not preempted by
ERISA, the Pegram Court paved the way for patients to
challenge benefit denials made by medical professionals who
deny coverage, even in spite of contrary recommendations made
by primary care physicians intimately acquainted with a
patient's medical history. 92 It is important to note the relatively
narrow context of the Pegram decision, which held only that
challenges to adverse benefits decisions, in which a medical
director's decision involved an analysis of the "how" and "when"
of a proposed treatment, were not preempted by ERISA, and
should be pursued under state medical malpractice or other
relevant common law tort theories. 93
2. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran
The Supreme Court's decision in Rush marked the third time
in four years that the Court considered an ERISA preemption

90 See ZANGLEIN, supra note 37, at 318 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc's, 508 U.S.
248 (1993)) (noting that money damages against nonfiduciary service providers are not
available under ERISA, even where such service providers participate in plan fiduciary's
breach of duty); Boos, supra note 5, at 83-84 (noting Court's ruling that "administrators
working through their doctors when making mixed eligibility decisions are not acting as
fiduciaries"). See generally Weisenborn, supra note 79, at 150 (establishing that ERTSA's
preemption is not unlimited).
91 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding mixed eligibility
decisions by health maintenance organization physicians are not fiduciary decisions
under ERISA); see also Osgood, supra note 20, 877-82 (quoting Pegram) (examining the
Pegram Court's ruling that fiduciary decisions or obligations "can apply to managing,
advising, and administering an ERISA plan," which includes exercising "discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [an ERISA] plan," and
holding that medical necessity decision is an "inextricably mixed" medical administrative
decision, and that such "mixed eligibility" decisions that MCO makes through its
physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA).
92 See Boos, supra note 5, at 65 (noting that Supreme Court's decision in Pegram has
created new line of attack against MCOs); see also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228-29
(acknowledging that pure eligibility decisions, "simple yes-or-no questions, like whether
appendicitis is a covered condition," are likely rare, and defining mixed decisions as more
common, such as "whether one treatment option is so superior.., and needed so
promptly, that a decision to proceed would meet the medical necessity requirement");
Scott M. Riemer, HMOs Face a Post-'Pegram' World, 224 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (July 13, 2000)
(stating that patient may challenge denial to receive 24 hours of care).
93 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236-37 (stating Court's position that Congress did not
have in mind, nor is there anything to be gained, by opening federal courthouse doors to
fiduciary malpractice claims); Boos, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that fear of flood of new
litigation was unfounded); Riemer, supra note 92 (asserting that Pegram states that to
extent state malpractice actions do not assert claims challenging "eligibility," they are not
preempted).
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case. 94 Rush is the most recent case to address where the
seemingly endless ERISA preemption wanes and where
96
permissible state regulation begins. 95 Writing for the majority,
Justice Souter appropriately noted that ERISA "seems
97
simultaneously to preempt everything and hardly anything,"
declaring simply that the Court has "no choice" but to temper the
assumption that 'the ordinary meaning.. . accurately expresses
the legislative purpose." 98 The Rush court held that the state law
at issue did not create an alternate state remedy that conflicted
with ERISA's federal remedies, and was therefore saved from
preemption. 99

94 See Supreme Court Agrees to ConsiderAnother ERISA Preemption Case, MANAGED
CARE WEEK, Nov. 10, 2003, at 4 (noting, in April 2003, Supreme Court upheld Kentucky
"any willing provider" law in Kentucky Assn. of Health Plans, Inc., et al. v. Miller; in June
2002 upheld Illinois "external review" law in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran and in
June 2000 ruled in Pegram v. Herdrich that HMOs could not be sued over use of
physician financial incentives to limit care); Marcia Coyle, 50 Laws on HMOs? Arguments
Coming Today on Whether Federal Acts Preempts States' Right to Order Reviews of
Disputed Medical Decisions, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Jan 16, 2002, at A9 (stating that
Supreme Court is once again venturing into managed health care arena in Rush decision);
Marcia Coyle, Health Firms Lose a Big Case Ruling is a Boost to State Regulation, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 7, 2003, at Al (stating that Rush and Kentucky cases will be end of managed
health care era "as we know it").
95 See Flood, supra note 83, at 511 (noting that Court considered whether Illinois Act
satisfied McCarran-Ferguson three-factor test, which determines that "a state law
regulates insurance if the practice it regulates (1) transfers or spreads policyholders" risk;
(2) is an integral part of the relationship between insurer and insured because it affects
the substantive terms of the policy; or (3) is limited to entities within the insurance
agency"); Don R. Sampen, States Have Authority to Protect HMO Patients, CHICAGO DAILY
L. BULL., July 16, 2002, at 16 (stating that Supreme Court recently held that Illinois
Health Maintenance Organization Act provision is not preempted by ERISA); Who
Governs the HMOs?, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Nov 25, 2002, at A15 (noting that on
June 20, 2002, Supreme Court recognized that states have more freedom than formerly
assumed to regulate HMOs that serve ERISA plans).
96 See Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 358 (2002) (Justice Souter was
joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer).
97 Rush, 536 U.S. at 389.
98 Id. (expressing frustration with occupation of court's time by 'unhelpful drafting of
these antiphonal clauses,' citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149 (2001); California
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)).
99 Rush, 536 U.S. at 387 (stating that as health care is traditionally relegated to state
realm, "there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestation of congressional
purpose"); see David L. Trueman, Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ERISA
Preemption?, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 427, 461-62 (Summer 2004) (noting that Rush lends
support to "the contention that health care regulation is a matter of traditional state
interest"); Joseph DeMarzo & Michael H. Zhu, The Impact of Rush on Independent
External Review of HMO Care Decisions, MED. MAL. LAW & STRATEGY, Sept. 2002, at 1
(analyzing briefly, but comprehensively, majority's application of McCarran-Ferguson
factors to independent review law, as well as Court's initial use of 'common sense test').
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Here, the Court determined that a portion of an Illinois ActOO
to an
requiring HMOsL01 to submit benefit denials
10
2
physician reviewer "in the event of a dispute
independent
between the primary care physician and the [HMO] regarding
the medical necessity10 3 of a covered service proposed by a
primary care physician"104 was a permissible state regulation of
insurance1 0 5 with which Rush Prudential had to comply.106
100 Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 125/410 (2000).
101 See Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2(9)
(2000) (defining "Health Maintenance Organization" as any organization formed under
laws of Illinois or another state "to provide or arrange for one or more health care plans
under a system which causes any part of the risk of health care delivery to be borne by
the organization or its providers"); see also Rush, 536 U.S. at 371-72 (noting general
definition of HMO under Illinois law includes not only organizations that "provide" health
care plans, but those that "arrange for" them to be provided, so long as any part of risk of
health care delivery rests upon organization or its providers); An Overview of Illinois
Insurance Licensure Issues in Provider Network Development, ILL. HEALTH L. UPDATE,
Mar. 1995, at 1 (stating that under narrow construction of HMO Act, HMO is any
organization which accepts capitated payments with HMO license).
102 See Rush, 536 U.S. at 361-62 (defining "independent physician reviewer" as
unaffiliated with HMO and jointly selected by HMO and patient, and further noting that
if independent reviewer decides that treatment is medically necessary covered service
under contract, HMO must provide covered service); Highest U.S., MD Courts Ok State
Independent Review Laws, DAILY RECORD, Mar. 15, 2003, at 1 (noting that independent
physician review must be conducted to determine what is medically necessary); Don R.
Sampen, 7th Circuit Cracks Open Door for Illinois HMO Patients, CHICAGO DAILY L.
BULL., Nov. 7, 2000, at 6 (discussing Rush decision upholding Illinois requirement that
HMOs submit to independent physician review procedure).
103 See Rush, 536 U.S. at 361. It is important to note that the Illinois statute only
required review of a decision made on the basis of a treatment or service's 'medical
necessity.' Id. It did not require review of an HMO's decision that the treatment or
surgery is not covered by the contractual terms of the agreement between the patient and
the HMO. Id. See Highest U.S., MD Courts Ok State Independent Review Laws, supra
note 102, at 1. The author emphasized that, under Illinois law, independent review is
limited to a consideration of what is medically necessary. Id. Patricia Manson, Ruling
Against HMO Spurs Protest by 4 Appeals Judges, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 20, 2000,
at 3. The article noted that Illinois law requires HMO to provide coverage if independent
physician who conducts review determines that treatment is medically necessary. Id.
104 Rush, 536 U.S. at 361.
105 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (stating that nothing in this title shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking or securities) (emphasis added); see also Flood, supra note 83, at 511 (analyzing
majority's application of McCarran-Ferguson test which states that "a state law regulates
insurance if the practice it regulates (1) transfers or spreads policyholders' risk" (which is
a characteristic inherent in an HMO as well as an insurance company); "(2) is an integral
part of the relationship between insurer and insured because it affects the substantive
terms of the policy; or (3) is limited to entities within the insurance agency," subsequently
noting that Illinois Act satisfied later two of these factors, and that satisfaction of only
one is required in order for statute to be deemed regulation of insurance). But see
Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 480 (2003) (believing that
Court's use of McCarran-Ferguson case law in ERISA context has misdirected attention,
failed to provide clear guidance to lower federal courts and... added little to the relevant
analysis).
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Justice Souter announced that ERISA merely requires plans to
provide internal appeals of benefits denials,107 a process in which
the Illinois statute played no role, instead "providing for extra
review once the internal process is complete."os
Further, the Court noted that when an HMO provides a
care,
of
medically
necessary
contractual
guarantee
"determinations of coverage cannot be untangled from
physicians' judgments about reasonable medical treatment."109
The Court concluded that the prevailing "combination of insurer
and provider" remains a "dominant feature" of managed care. 1 10
The majority held that HMOs financial risk-bearing brings their
coverage decision-making within the scope of the savings
clause."l' Justice Souter wrote, "Rush cannot checkmate common
sense by trying to submerge HMOs' insurance features beneath
an exclusive characterization of HMOs as providers of health
11 2

care."

The ultimate effect of this landmark decision is that HMOs are
now forced to seriously consider those state independent review
laws 1l 3 that have yet to be litigated in federal courts, 114 as well

106 See Rush, 536 U.S. at 364, 387 (discussing and ultimately affirming 7th Circuit
holding that Illinois HMO Act regulated insurance and that "independent review
requirement [was not that] different from a state-mandated contractual term" that Court
"had held to survive ERISA preemption"); see also Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,
230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358,
375-376 (1999)).
107 ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
108 See Rush, 536 U.S. at 385.
109 Id. at 383 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 229 (2000)) (noting that
according to Illinois Act independent examiners must be physicians with credentials
similar to those of primary care physicians, and are expected to exercise independent
medical judgment in deciding what medical necessity requires).
110 See Rush, 536 U.S. at 370.
111 See id. at
355, 372 (explaining that Congress, prior to ERISA's passage,
"demonstrated an awareness of HMOs as risk-bearing organizations subject to state
insurance regulation," while Illinois law defines HMOs, in terms of risk bearing, as
having taken over much business formerly performed by traditional indemnity insurers,
and are almost universally regulated as insurers).
112 Id. at 370.
113 See DeMarzo, supra note 99, at 1 (emphasizing importance of legitimization of
legislative initiatives in 40 other states (and District of Columbia) where similar
independent review panels were established to review HMO decisions); see also Lindsey
Gastright Churchill, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran. Federal Intervention Looms as
Supreme Court Rules That ERISA Does Not Preempt State Laws Requiring Independent
Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and Lays Groundwork for Different Independent
Review ProvisionsFrom All Fifty States, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 535, 562 (2002) (stating that
benefit administrators will have to make determinations based on independent review
laws). See generally Jake Griffin, HMO Lawsuit Ruling Paves Way for Second Opinions,
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as those that had been held to be preempted prior to the Rush
decision,"i 5 and are now unable to rely solely on preemption to
rescue any number of negligent coverage decisions from the
rarely forgiving grip of state courtrooms obeying state laws."l 6
However, Rush is not as sweeping a decision as it may seem on
its face. The Court's ruling does not cover approximately fifty
million Americans117 who get their insurance through employers
who self-fund health benefits.118 ERISA's "deemer clause"
CHI. DAILY HERALD, June 21, 2002, at 1 (noting that patients will now have opportunity
to seek second opinions in independent review boards).
114 See, e.g., Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Maryland, 123 S. Ct. 1964
(2003) (dismissing petition filed by CIGNA. subsidiary Connecticut General Life, seeking
review of Maryland's external review law where petitioner alleged that ERISA preempted
internal and external review processes required under 1998 Maryland law, and Maryland
Court of Appeals held law fell within savings clause as regulating insurance); see also
George A. Lyden, HMO Liability In New York: How Pegram v. Herdrich and Right-to-Sue
Statutes Have Created New Alternatives For HMO Enrollees, 7 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J.
43, 54-55 (2003) (noting that, after Pegram and Rush, cases against HMOs will be
increasingly decided in state rather than federal courts). But see Churchill, supra note
113, at 565 (arguing that congressional patient rights legislation is imminent and will
provide for uniform independent review mechanism).
115 See, e.g., Supreme Court Agrees to Consider External Review Law in January,
STATE HEALTH MON., Dec. 1, 2001, at 1 (noting, prior to Rush, that there were
independent review laws for commercial enrollees in place in some 40 states and
nationally for Medicare+Choice program); The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Refused to
Reconsider its Decision to Strike Down the Independent Review Portion of Texas' HMO
Liability Law, MANAGED MEDICARE & MEDICAID, Aug. 14, 2000 (presenting Fifth Court's
holding that ERISA preempts Texas independent review law); see also Sarah Lueck,
Court Backs Patient Appeals in Battle over HMO Coverage, WALL STREET J. , June 21,
2002, at Al (stating that 42 states and District of Columbia had adopted independent
review laws by 2002).
116 See Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that
action seeking to hold health plan vicariously liable for negligent actions of physician is
not preempted by ERISA, and ultimately remanding case for lack of jurisdiction to state
court); see also Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, 93 N.Y.2d 209, 221 (N.Y. 1999) (quoting
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997)) (stating that there is nothing about plaintiffs
claims [for medical malpractice and breach of contract] that "conflictn with the provisions
of ERISA or operates to frustrate its [objectives];" to the contrary, plaintiffs claims are
consistent with ERISA's "principal object": protection of plan participants and
beneficiaries); Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 717 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (reasoning that
because ERISA was enacted prior to advent of cost-containment and HMOs, Congress
could not have envisioned nor intended resultant foreclosure of recovery to plan
beneficiaries injured by negligent medical decisions, subsequently holding that HMOs
may be sued in state court on negligence claims).
117 See DeMarzo, supra note 99, at 1 (speculating that fifty million Americans now
get insurance through employers who self-fund health benefits). See generally Fred J.
Hellinger, The Expanding Scope of State Legislation, 276 JAMA 1065, 1066 (1996) (noting
that in 1993 roughly forty-four million people were enrolled in self-funded employee
health plans governed by ERISA); Supreme Court Solicits Input on Self-funded Health
Plan Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 11, 1997 (stating that at least 44 million
employees are covered by self funded employee health plans).
118 See Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the
Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J.
LEGIS. 307, 308-09 (1997) (explaining any state law purporting to regulate insurance, as
applied to health care plan "established or maintained by an employer," would fall within
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provides an exception to its savings clause that forbids states
from regulating self-funded plans as insurers.119 Nor does the
decision standardize external review rules, which still may vary
from state to state. 120
It is impossible, however, to ignore that the Rush decision,
unlike Pegram, was the result of a deep divide within the Court.
Justice Thomas issued a dissent 21 in which he noted that
despite the "panoply of remedial devices"122 available to Ms.
Moran under ERISA, she decided to "short circuit"12 3 those
remedies through the "arbitral-like mechanism"12 4 under the

scope of deemer clause and thus be preempted by ERISA); see also Some Small Firms
Embrace Self-Funding, But Experts Warn That Risks Abound, MANAGED CARE WEEK,
Oct. 27, 2003, at 1 (acknowledging "certain state mandates that apply to insured
programs do not apply to self-insured programs because the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act exempts self-funded plans from many state insurance regulations"). See
generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Against a Federal Patients' Bill of Rights, 21 YALE L. &
POL'y REV. 443, 464 (2003) (arguing that ERISA § 514 (currently § 1144) should be
amended to allow for state regulation of self-funded plans).
119 See Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 372 n.6 (2002), (citing FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)) (remarking that ERISA's "deemer" clause
provides exception to its savings clause that forbids states from regulating self-funded
plans as insurers and thus, that Illinois' Act would not be "saved" as insurance law to
extent it applied to self-funded plans); see also Zelinsky, supra note 118, at 464 (stating
that deemer clause prevents state regulation of self-funded plans). See generally
Morrissey, supra note 118, at 308-09 (noting that deemer clause applies to self-funded
plans).
120 See DeMarzo, supra note 99, at 1 (stating that external review rules vary from
state-to-state); see also McLean, supra note 69, at 319 (stating that Rush authorizes states
to impose administrative due process (e.g., third-party review of the MCOs' decisions) on
MCOs, but sets no standards for review). See generally Churchill, supra note 113, at 565
(arguing for congressional patient rights legislation that would provide a uniform
independent review mechanism).
121 Rush, 536 U.S. at 388 (presenting Justice Thomas' dissent joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy); see also Rush Pru Decision Leaves Health
Plans With Broadly Varied State Appeals Laws, MANAGED CARE WEEK, June 24, 2004, at
1 (describing arguments of dissent by Justice Thomas that ERISA was designed to protect
employer benefit plans from widely varying state regulation); Matkov, Salsman, Madoff &
Gunn, HMO ruling may raise health care costs, ILL. EMP. L. LETTER, Oct. 2002, at 1
(analyzing Thomas' arguments that Court's decision disintegrates uniformity of ERISA
that Congress intended).
122 Rush, 536 U.S. at 394 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)) (noting that "commonly included in the panoply
constituting part of this enforcement scheme are: suits under § 502(a)(1)(B) [currently 29
U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B)] (authorizing an action to recover benefits, obtain a declaratory
judgment that one is entitled to benefits and to enjoin an improper refusal to pay
benefits), suits under § 502(a)(2) [currently § 1132(a)(2)] and 409 (authorizing suit to seek
removal of the fiduciary), and a claim for attorney's .fees under § 502(g) [currently §
1132(g)]").
123 Id. at 389.
124 Id. at 394-96 (arguing that "as a binding decision on the merits of the controversy
the § 4-10 review resembles nothing so closely as arbitration" because "the decision of the
§ 4-10 medical reviewer is ultimately enforceable through a suit under § 502(a) of ERISA,"
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Illinois act. 12 5 The crux of the dissent's objection to the statute
was that it added to or supplemented the remedies available
26
under ERISA, and should therefore be preempted.1
After the recent Travelers, Rush and Pegram12 7 decisions,
there remains a complex and evolving body of law regarding
HMO liability and ERISA preemption. Liability may depend on
any number of theories, 12 8 as well as upon whether the plan is an
ERISA-qualified plan, whether the plan is self-funded12 9 and,
mostly, upon prevailing judicial attitudes towards ERISA

and "[l]ike the decision of any arbitrator, it is enforceable through a subsequent judicial
action" following limited judicial review).
125 See id. at 392, 395 (2002). Justice Thomas asserted that "although a contractual
agreement to arbitrate - which does not constitute a 'state law' relating to 'any employee
benefit plan' - is outside § 514(a) of ERISA's preemptive scope, states may not circumvent
ERISA preemption by mandating an alternative arbitral-like remedy as a plan term
enforceable through an ERISA action. Id. at 395. In addition, Justice Thomas conceded
that "the majority [was] correct that § 4-10 [of the Illinois statute] does not mirror all
procedural and evidentiary aspects of 'common arbitration."' Id.
126 See id. at 401 (stating that § 4-10 is perfect example of state law that should be
"'pre-empted in accordance with ordinary principles of conflict preemption" because it
"provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to,
ERISA's remedial scheme"); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)
(declaring that '[t]he expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations
under ERISA - regulated plans would develop ... would make little sense if the remedies
available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries could be supplemented or supplanted
by varying state laws"); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)
(stressing that Congress did not "intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot
to incorporate expressly").
127 Accord Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 333-34, 341-42 (2003)
(upholding Kentucky's 'any willing provider law' in spite of HMOs' claims that ERISA
preempted state's regulation of providers, who were held to be incidental to regulation of
insurance and therefore saved from preemption).
128 See Yanez v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(announcing that "courts have found that tort actions that seek to hold defendant health
maintenance organizations vicariously liable for medical malpractice are not preempted
by ERISA"); see also Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, Health Law Symposium: What If
You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 235, 236 (2003) (maintaining that ERISA's ability to prevent state laws
depends on which theory of liability is asserted); Peter J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich:
On Peritonitis,Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 767, 771 n.2 (2001) (posing question "[oin what theory should the
plan be held accountable" and listing several possible theories).
129 See Hammer, supra note 128, at 771 n.2 (articulating that liability depends on
ERISA qualification and funding); Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. at 336 n.1 (2003)
(asserting that "ERISA's savings clause does not require that a state law regulate
'insurance companies' or even 'the business of insurance' to be saved from preemption; it
need only be a 'law... which regulates insurance,' and self-insured plans engage in same
sort of risk pooling arrangements as separate entities that provide insurance to employee
benefit plan.") (emphasis in original). See generally Hutchinson v. Benton Casing Serv.,
Inc., 619 F. Supp. 831, 835 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (reiterating that ERISA's savings clause
prevents preemption of state law which "regulates insurance").
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preemption. 130 That body of law is expected to be narrowed, if not
relieved from its burden of complexity, by the Supreme Court's
decision in CIGNA Healthcare of Texas v. Calad and Aetna
13
HealthcareInc. v. Davila. 1

III. CONSIDERATIONS OF FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. Areas of TraditionalState Concern

An important premise of preemption jurisprudence is that the
Supreme Court has never "assumed lightly that Congress has
derogated state regulation,"13 2 but instead has begun each
preemption analysis with the traditionally strong presumption133
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.134 In cases

130 See Hammer, supra note 128, at 771 n.2 (detailing system's 'patchwork nature'
and stating near impossibility of answering legal questions concerning managed care
liability with any level of specificity, other than "it depends"); Friedelbaum, supra note 12,
at 1245-47(explaining "contemporary judicial federalism has passed through several
phases, revealing its remarkable pliancy and adaptability"); see also Harris v. Mut. of
Omaha Cos., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21393, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (highlighting that
"[diespite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes are human beings, and as
persons, are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would be").
131 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003) (granting certiorari), rev'd,
124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004); CIGNA HealthCare of Tex., Inc. v. Calad, 124 S. Ct. 463 (2003)
(providing grant of certiorari), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004); see also Edward F. McArdle,
2002-2003 Survey of New York Law: Health Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1179, 1230 (2004)
(suggesting that these decisions will allow Supreme Court to decide whether "state law
medical malpractice and personal injury actions... survive ERISA preemption");
Supreme Court to decide if HMOs May Be Sued in State Court, supra note 3 (describing
arguments from both sides and noting that "the cases... are being closely watch by
insurers and employer groups").
132 N.Y.S. Conf. Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 654 (1995)..
133 Id. (specifying that this ERISA analysis begins with a "presumption that Congress
does not intend to supplant state law"); see also Boos, supra note 5, at 91 (reiterating
existence of "starting presumption" in dealing with issues that involve fields traditionally
'occupied' by states). See generally Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of
Hand: Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against
Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 36 (2002) (emphasizing Egelhoff Court's statement that
"there is indeed a presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regulation
such as family law... [b]ut that presumption can be overcome where ... Congress has
made clear its desire for preemption").
134 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654 (expressing starting presumption that "Congress
does not intend to supplant state law"); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981) (establishing that judicial analysis "under the Supremacy Clause starts with the
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law"); Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) (stating that "[i]t should never be held that Congress intends to
supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the states, even
when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested").
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where federal law is said to bar state action 135 in fields of
traditional state regulation, 136 the Court quite naturally assumes
that "the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."138 Throughout the vast history of
judicial preemption analysis, the Supreme Court has balanced
the need for "national uniformity of regulation, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and representative government, against the
states' interests in regulating to promote the health and safety of
the local community."139 Both healthcare140 and insurance
135 See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 144, 151 (2001) (holding that ERISA
preempted state statute which revoked designation of spouse as beneficiary automatically
following divorce because it "conflicted with ERISA's requirements" and "interfered with
nationally uniform plan administration"); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 837, 844
(1997) (concluding that Louisiana's community property and succession laws are
preempted by ERISA due to "th[e] direct clash between [the] state law and the provisions
and objectives of ERISA"). See generally Friedelbaum, supra note 12, at 1283 (surveying
variety of cases where 'traditional state concern' is at issue, subsequently noting federalist
revival on Supreme Court and existing opportunity for reinvented activism arising in
conventional contexts).
136 See De Buono v. Nysa-Ila Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997)
(affirming that "historic police powers of the State include the regulation of matters of
health and safety"); see also Hillsborough County v. Auto. Med. Lab. Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
719 (1985) (identifying plasmapheresis regulation as regulation of health and safety
matters, and therefore "primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern"); Napier v.
Atl. C.L.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 610 (1926) (finding state requirements which promoted
health and safety "proper exercise[s] of [the state's] police power").
138 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See e.g., Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) (declaring that presumption is
against preemption, and we are not inclined to read limitations into federal statutes in
order to enlarge their preemptive scope without indication in legislative history that
Congress had such distinction in mind); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)
(noting that one field which Congress is said to have preempted - particular aspects of
commerce - has been traditionally occupied by states, and as such requires showing that
clear and manifest purpose of Congress was to preempt state authority); Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (theorizing that Congress' intention
to exclude states from exerting their police power in field of regulation of locomotive
equipment must be clearly manifested in order for State authority to be preempted).
139 Margaret J. Farrell, ERISA Preemptionand Regulation of Managed Health Care:
The Case for Managed Federalism,23 AM. J. L. AND MED. 251, 259 (1997).
140 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (stating that in field of health
care, which is traditionally regulated by states, there is no ERISA preemption without
clear manifestation of congressional purpose); see, e.g., N.Y.S. Conf. Of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-56 (1995) (acknowledging that health
care is historically a matter of state concern); Hillsborough County v. Auto. Med Labs,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (noting that regulation of health and safety matters
constitute primary and historical matters of local concern).
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regulationl4l have long been considered areas of traditional state

concern. 142
B. Legislative Intent
It is widely acknowledged that the enactment of ERISA was a
congressional reaction to the failure of states to regulate
corruption in union-dominated pension and benefit plans.14 3
ERISA's purpose was "to protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants and beneficiaries of financial and other
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to Federal Courts."144 The legislative
history of the ERISA preemption provisioni45 and its exceptions,

141 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §1011 (2004) (declaring that
"continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States");
see, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415-18 (1946) (discussing history
of local insurance regulation); J. Haakon Knutson, Credit Scoring in the Insurance
Industry: Discrimination or Good Business?, 15 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 315, 318-19
(2003) (noting traditional state law primacy in insurance industry regulation).
142 See California Div. of Labor Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316
(1997) (arguing that "reading of the preemption clause resulting in the preemption of
traditionally state-regulated substantive law in those areas where ERISA has nothing to
say would be 'unsettling"); see, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 119 (1989)
(noting Congress' reluctance to interfere in traditional state matters); Hillsborough
County., 471 U.S. at 719 (implying congressional deference for matters typically governed
by states).
143 See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (stating ERISA's
preemption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with task of coordinating complex
administrative activities: a patch-work scheme of regulation would introduce considerable
inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with
existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting
them.); see also Ochmann, supra note 46, at 581 (noting Congress' primary intent was to
safeguard workers pension plan assets from corporate and union misappropriation as
legislative provisions encompassed all employer-sponsored health benefit plans, except
where employer is governmental or church entity); Rosenbaum, supra note 37, at 171
(asserting that ERISA resulted from congressional concern about states' inaction in
regulating pension plans).
144 Hummel, supra note 59, at 651.
145 See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745-46
(1985) (setting forth legislative history of ERISA's preemption provision); Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (discussing legislative debates over preemption
clause and asserting that Congress rejected limited preemption clause for a broader one);
Daniel M. Fox & Daniel Schaffer, Health Policy and ERISA- Interest Groups and
Semipreemption, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 239 (1989) (summarizing ERISA's
legislative history).
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although often cited and hotly debated, is almost skeletal.146
There is no discussion in that history of "the relationship
between the general pre-emption clause and the saving clause,
47
and indeed very little discussion of the saving clause at all."1
48
In the early drafts of ERISA, the preemption clause1
preempted only those state laws dealing with subjects regulated
by ERISA.149 The clause was inexplicably expanded ten days
before congressional action150 (and after the savings clause was
authored in its present form) to state that the Act covered "any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan."151 Even those courts broadly
construing the preemption clause acknowledge "the change was
made with little explanation by the Conference Committee, and
there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress was
aware of the new prominence given the saving clause in light of

146 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 (highlighting legislative concerns and intent for
ERISA's preemption clause); see also SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 4771 (Comm. Print 1976) (stating "it is also
intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal
with issues involving the rights and obligations under the private welfare and pension
plans"); Rosenbaum, supra note 37, at 173 (acknowledging sparse legislative history of
ERISA is revealed in Shaw and Metropolitan Life).
147 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 745 (citing S 3589, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 14, 116
CONG. REC. 7284 (1970)). The Court theorizes that preemption clause was broadened out
of fear that "state professional associations" would otherwise hinder development of such
employee-benefit programs as "prepaid legal service programs." Id at 745. See 120 CONG.
REC. 29197, 29933, 29949 (1974). Remarks regarding the preemption provision of Rep.
Dent, Sen. Williams and Sen. Javits were recorded. Id. There is no suggestion that the
preemption provision was broadened out of any concern about state regulation of
insurance contracts, beyond what Sen. Javits stated was a general concern about
"potentially conflicting State laws." Id. at 29942.
148 ERISA § 1144(a).. In its current form, the preemption clause states that "the
provisions of this sub-chapter ...shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id.
149 See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 745-46 (noting that in ERISA's early drafts,
only state laws dealing with subjects regulated by ERISA were preempted); see also H. R.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 383 (1974) (stating "[T]he preemption provisions of title I are
not to exempt any person from any State law that regulates insurance."); Rosenblatt,
supra note 37, at 173-74 (examining phrasing of prior bills [which had contained
insurance savings clause, inserted to ensure consistency with McCarran-Ferguson Act]
declaring that "nothing in the Act shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any state which regulates insurance.").
150 See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 745 (stating that preemption clause was
broadened at last minute with little explanation); Rosenblatt, supra note 37, at 174
(noting that House-Senate conference committee proposed two major changes 10 days
before final congressional action on ERISA). See generally Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (describing preemption clause's legislative history).
151 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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the rewritten preemption clause."15 2 The end result of this
complicated last-minute modification was the creation of a
statute that exempts state insurance laws from preemption, and
then exempts ERISA plans themselves from state insurance
regulation.15 3 Since ERISA's enactment in 1974, the growth of
managed care 154 has become an unbridled phenomenon that can
only be described as unforeseeable.155 It would be foolish to
assume that Congress anticipated this burst of managed care
activity15 6 in the early 1970s and instituted ERISA with any
anticipation or expectancy of the cost-containment measures, 15 7
152 MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 745.
153 See Rosenblatt, supra note 37, at 174 (noting conferees' failure to address why "a
century of state insurance law and doctrine should be abandoned with no substantive
federal standards being put in their place"); see also Farrell, supra note 139, at 265
(highlighting that self-insuring employers are legally free from both state laws relating to
ERISA plans and state insurance regulation). See generally Howell E. Jackson,
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploration Essay, 77
WASH. U.L.Q. 319, 361 (1999) (explaining that Congress' decision to exempt ERISA plans
from state insurance regulation has received "considerable criticism").
154 See John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old
Tensions The Building Blocks of Tomorrow's Health CareDelivery and Financing System,
3 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 22 (1996/1997) (describing rise of HMO membership from 3 million in
1970, to 9 million in 1980, to 34 million in 1990); see also Glodt, supra note 13, at 641
(explaining that HMO enrollment totaled over sixty million in 2000). See generally Nina
J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Health Care
Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C.L. REV 1, 27-28
(1995) (explaining that, from 1970s and into 1990s, dramatic changes in health care
industry have resulted from focus on managed care).
155 See Rosenblatt, supra note 37, at 12 (emphasizing that 53 million more people
were insured or self-insured by HMOs in 1990 than were in 1980); see also Marion Crain,
The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 543, 581 (2004)
(describing managed care as "phenomenon"). See generally Tracey Epps and Colleen M.
Flood, Have We Traded Away the Opportunity for Innovative Health Care Reform? The
Implications of the NAFTA for Medicare, 47 MCGILL L.J. 747, 785 (2002) (describing how
HMO enrollment increased "dramatically" from 1980 to 1990).
156 See Day, supra note 154, at 3 (explaining how health care expenditures have
grown five times faster than gross domestic product); see also Vernellia R. Randall,
Managed Care, Utilization Review, and FinancialRisk Shifting: Compensating Patients
for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1993)
(exploring unexpected growth of 1980's HMOs, possibly by expansion of health
maintenance to cover Medicaid and Medicare eligibles, despite discontinued government
loans). See generally Domenick C. DiCicco, Jr., HMO Liability for the Medical Negligence
of Member Physicians, 43 VILL. L. REV. 499, 502-03 (1998) (describing dramatic and
"explosive" growth of HMOs as subsequent to enactment of the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973).
157 See Ochmann, supra note 46, at 599 (describing how cost-containment practices
can actually "trigger foreseeable injuries" when patients are denied medically necessary
treatment); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Recent Case Developments, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 207,
216 (1999/2000) (explaining case law that examines whether Congress was unaware of
cost-containment measures utilized by HMOs when drafting ERISA). See generally
Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program,
33 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that Carter's mandatory hospital costcontainment plan was "resoundingly defeated").

2005]

ERISA PREEMPTIONJURISPRUDENCE

such as utilization review,1 58 that would eventually result in the
sort of coverage denials 159 that patients seek to question in state
courts today. 160
IV. ERISA

AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT161

A. Background
Ruby Calad became a member of CIGNA HealthCare of Texas,
Inc., a Texas HMO, through her husband's employer.i 62 Calad
underwent a hysterectomy with rectal, bladder and vaginal
repair, performed by a physician participating in the CIGNA
network.' 6 3 Although her treating physician recommended a
longer stay, CIGNA's hospital discharge nurse, acting as a
158 See Pittman, supra note 71, at 379 (purporting that Congress could not have
predicted "interjection into the ERISA 'system' of the medical utilization review process");
see also Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992)
(clarifying that many cost-containment features did not exist when Congress passed
ERISA and that utilization review is "fundamental change" since implementation of
ERISA). See generally Carla Jensen Hamborg, Medical Utilization: The New Frontierfor
Medical Malpractice Claims?, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 113, 138 (1992) (noting that preadministration review of proposed treatments plays important role in cost containment
function of HMOs).
159 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 U.S. 2488, 2498 (2004) (holding that
respondents' state law claims against an HMO based on injuries resulting from wrongful
denials of benefits were preempted by ERISA); see also Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322-23
(finding that plaintiffs wrongful death claim based on HMO's refusal to cover
hospitalization which resulted in loss of her unborn child was preempted by ERISA). See
generally Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients' Bill of Rights: Winners
and Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 58 (2001) (commenting that ERISA "eliminates an
important check on ... medical decisions" and fosters "less deterrence of substandard
medical decision making' by preempting state law claims based on coverage denials while
not providing federal remedies).
160 See, e.g., Davila, 124 U.S. at 2498 (highlighting respondents' claim that HMO's
wrongful denial of coverage benefits caused them injury); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (noting ERISA preemption of plaintiffs common law claim that
HMO denied them benefits); Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002)
(illuminating how plaintiffs HMO negligently refused to cover doctor recommended
treatment).
161 See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1323 (holding ERISA preempts state law wrongful
death claim, in which parents allege medical necessity coverage determination
proximately caused death of unborn child, exemplifying Fifth Circuit's role as relative
hotbed of ERISA litigation both prior to and after passage of the Texas Health Care
Liability Act); see also Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 64344 (5th Cir. 2000) (refusing to read Pegram to entail "that every conceivable state law
claim survives preemption so long as it is based on a mixed question of eligibility and
treatment"). But see Roark, 307 F.3d at 305 (holding that plaintiffs' claims were not
completely preempted by ERISA and noting that district court should have remanded
such claims for further review).
162 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 302 (relaying the facts of each plaintiffs complaint).
163 Id. (describing plaintiffs surgery).
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utilization reviewer, 164 made the ultimate decision that the
standard, one day hospital stay would be sufficient.16 5 Calad
suffered a medical emergency that caused her to be readmitted a
few days later.166 She attributes these complications to her early
release.167

Juan Davila received Aetna HMO coverage through his
employer's health plan.168 He is a post-polio patient who suffers
from diabetes and arthritis.169 His primary care physician
prescribed Vioxx for Davila's arthritis pain. 7 0 The Court noted
that studies have shown that Vioxx has a lower rate of
gastrointestinal toxicity (e.g., bleeding, ulceration, perforation of
the stomach) than do the other arthritis drugs on Aetna's
formulary.171 Before filling the prescription, Aetna required
Davila to enter its "step program:" 172 Davila would first have to
try two different medications; only if he suffered a "detrimental
reaction to the medications or failed to improve would Aetna
evaluate him for Vioxx use." 17 3
164 Id. (noting action despite alternative recommendation); see also Ochmann, supra
note 46, at 577 (defining utilization review as "external evaluations of medical decisions");
see also Reece, supra note 159, at 33 (explaining that HMOs perform utilization reviews to
assess necessity of medical treatment, pre-treatment, that sometimes conflict with
medical judgment). See generally Wickline v. State of California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811
(Cal. Rptr. 2d1986) (noting that, in utilization review, "authority for the rendering of
health care services must be obtained before medical care is rendered").
165 Roark, 307 F.3d at 302 (describing nurse's decision).
166 See id. (specifying that Calad suffered from "complications).
167 See id. (noting Calad's complaint that, as reviewed, "CIGNA had failed to use
ordinary care in making its medical necessity decisions, CIGNA's system made
substandard care more likely, and CIGNA acted negligently when it made its medical
necessity decisions").
168 Id. at 303 (discussing lawsuit brought by Davila against HMO).
169 Id. (noting medical conditions suffered by Mr. Davila).
170 Id. (stating medications prescribed for Mr. Davila's medical conditions).
171 Id. (discussing studies have shown Vioxx's lower rate of gastrointestinal toxicity):
see also My Dr., PrescriptionMedications for Rheumatoid Arthritis, available at http://
www.mydr.com.audefault.asp?article=2750 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) (stating that two
COX-2 specific inhibitors (coxibs) are available, celecoxib (e.g. Celebrex) and rofecoxib
(e.g. Vioxx), and that coxibs are non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agents shown to have
much lower rates of gastric ulcer associated with them than conventional, older NSAIDs).
James F. Graumlich, Preventing gastrointestinal complications of NSAIDs, POST
GRADUATE MEDICINE, May 2001, at 17 (suggesting that there are reasons to believe
celecoxib and rofecoxib might be safer and thus reduce risk for clinically relevant
gastrointestinal toxicity when compared with older NSAIDs).
172 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 303 (informing Davila that he must follow "step program"
where he "first would have to try two different medications" before he could even be
considered for Vioxx use). See generally Tamar Terzian, Director-to-ConsumerPrescription
Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 149, 159-61 (1999) (discussing MCO's drug
formularies and treatment methods).
173 Roark, 307 F.3d at 303.
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As part of the step program, Davila was first given naprosyn (a
less expensive pain reliever). After three weeks, Davila suffered
from bleeding ulcers, which caused a near heart attack and
internal bleeding.17 4 He was rushed to the hospital for emergency
treatment, where he was given seven units of blood and kept in
critical care for five days.1 75 Davila can no longer ingest any pain
medication that is absorbed through the stomach. 1 76
Both Calad and Davila brought suit against their respective
HMOs in Texas state court, seeking damages for their personal
injuries177 under the Texas Health Care Liability Act. 1 78 Calad
alleged CIGNA had "failed to use ordinary care in making its
medical necessity decisions, CIGNA's system made substandard
care more likely and CIGNA acted negligently when it made its
medical necessity decisions."179 Davila alleged the same against
Aetna.S0 Both HMOs removed the cases to federal court
asserting that these claims were preempted by ERISA.181
174 See id. at 303 (noting symptoms suffered by Mr. Davila after being placed on
program).
175 Id. (stating further medical treatment required by Mr. Davila).
176 Id. (noting continued medical problems suffered by Mr. Davila).
177 Id. at 302-03 (discussing background of Calad's and Davila's respective suits);
Trueman, supra note 99, at 442 (stating that "in the cases of Ruby Calad and Juan
Davila, the issue was whether section 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] of ERISA
preempted claims under a Texas statute that authorized causes of action against a
managed care entity"). See generally Agrawal, supra note 128, at 236 (arguing ERISA
has significantly restricted abilities of plan beneficiaries to seek damages for conduct of
managed care organizations, including medical necessity decisions, medical management
policies or other coverage determinations that affect care received by beneficiary).
178 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.0002(a)-(b) (2004).
(a) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed
care entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making
health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary care.
(b) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed
care entity for a health care plan is also liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by the health care treatment decisions made by its: (1)
employees; (2) agents; (3) ostensible agents; or (4) representatives who are acting on
its behalf and over whom it has the right to exercise influence or control or has
actually exercised influence or control which result in the failure to exercise ordinary
care.
Id. at § 88.0002(a)-(b).
179 Roark, 307 F.3d at 302.
180 See id. at 303 (discussing similarities of allegations Davila made against Aetna to
those made against CIGNA by Calad).
181 Roark, 307 F.3d at 304 (noting "well-pleaded complaint rule" limits federal courts'
original jurisdiction to those cases in which plaintiffs complaint states cause of action
arising under federal law; a federal defense will not do, . . including defense of
preemption, ...recognizing an exception to rule for those few statutes whose "preemptive
force ... is so powerful as to displace entirely any state causes of action") (citations
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B. Preemption Analysis
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roark v. Humana, Inc.18 2
held that Calad and Davila's claims involved the sort of mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions1 83 at issue in Pegram, and
were therefore free from the formerly all-encompassing grasp of
ERISA preemption.1 8 4 It is widely acknowledged that ERISA
provides two types of preemption: complete preemption under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a), and conflict preemption under 29 U.S.C §
1144.185 The court noted that §1132, by providing a civil
enforcement cause of action,1 8 6 completely preempts any state

cause of action seeking the same relief.18 7 However, complete
omitted); see Calad v. CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538, at *1, *4*6 (N.D. Texas 2001), (noting that CIGNA was to bear burden of showing its removal was
proper and to establish court's jurisdiction over case); Davila v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24648, at *1, *3-*4 (N.D. Texas 2001), (noting that defendants, as
removing parties, have burden of establishing jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims and that
"question of whether federal jurisdiction exists is generally determined according to the
'well-pleaded-complaint rule"). See generally Richard E. Levy, Federal Preemption,
Removal Jurisdiction,and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 634
(1984) (analyzing mechanics of well-pleaded complaint rule and noting that plaintiff often
relies on state law while defendant often claims federal preemption and moves for
removal).
182 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
183 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 307-08 (discussing Pegram decision on "mixed eligibility
decisions" and concluding that § 502(a)(1)(B) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132] did not preempt
Calad's and Davila's claims).
184 See id. at 307 (acknowledging Pegram did not decide precise issue in Roark whether, under § 502(a)(2) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)], a patient can hold HMO
directly liable for its own medical malpractice, but arguing that its holding is broad
enough to apply).
185 See id. at 305 (citing McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 515-17 (5th Cir.
1998)); see also Giles v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999)
(finding that there are two types of preemption under ERISA, field or complete
preemption, and ordinary or conflict preemption); Schmall, supra note 18, at 543-44
(discussing complete preemption as situation where Congress has left no room for state
action, and conflict preemption as situation where there is room for both state and federal
law, but, if there is conflict between them, federal law controls).
186 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), § 1144 (providing federal remedies including actions by
employee to recover cost of denied benefits, enforcement of rights under policy,
clarification of rights to future benefits, damages for breach of fiduciary duty, or an
injunction to halt unfair practices by ERISA provider); see also Kramer v. Smith Barney,
80 F.3d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that ERISA requires fiduciaries to discharge
their duties solely in interest of participants and beneficiaries, using care, skill, prudence
and diligence, and provides civil enforcement remedies for breach of such duty). See
generally Curtis D. Rooney, The States, Congress, or the Courts: Who Will Be First To
Reform ERISA Remedies?, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 73, 83 (1998) (stating that § 502 [currently
29 U.S.C. § 1132] "provides a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme and generally
preempts state law").
187 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 305-06 (emphasis added) (describing narrow effect of § 502
[currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)]); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
519 (1992) (assessing whether federal statute expressly preempts state law claim by
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preemption is less a principle of substantive preemption188 than
it is a rule of federal jurisdiction.18 9 Courts do not ask "whether
the state law conflicts with or frustrates a congressional purpose,
but whether the state law duplicates or falls within the scope of
an ERISA § 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132] remedy."19 0
States may not duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA §
1132.191 This is essentially the test employed for "complete
preemption."

192

In contrast, the court notes that §1144 provides for ordinary
conflict preemption. 193 As a result, state law claims (such as the
determining whether federal statute explicitly articulates intent to displace preexisting
form of state regulation).
188 See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995) (examining difference
between preemption under § 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)] and conflict
preemption under § 514(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)], noting that distinction is
important because "complete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule that has jurisdictional consequences"); see also Alison M. Sulentic, Happiness and
ERISA- Reflections on the Lessons of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for Sponsors of
Employee Benefit Plans, 5 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 7, 41 (2001) (explaining that
"cases regarding complete preemption leave open the possibility that a state court might
still face the substantive preemption of claims that have been remanded for failure to
meet the strict standards for complete preemption under Section 502(a)(1)(B) [currently
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)]"). See generally Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242,
250 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling against complete preemption, but noting that "the state court
will also have the task to determine to what extent, if any, Lazorko's claims against U.S.
Healthcare are substantively preempted under § 514 [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1144]").
189 See Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1987) (holding that under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)], complete preemption of certain
state law claims satisfies "arising under" requirement of federal question jurisdiction); see
also Churchill, supra note 113, at 540 (acknowledging that complete preemption under
ERISA § 502[currently 29 U.S.C. § 11321 "is actually a rule of federal jurisdiction that
acts as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule"); Reece, supra note 159, at 44
(recognizing that "[c]omplete preemption is actually a jurisdictional concept").
190 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 305 (citing McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 515
(1998)).
191 See id. at 310-11 (establishing "narrow" rule for complete preemption "that states
may not duplicate the causes of action listed in ERISA § 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)]"); see also Boos, supra note 5, at 81 (stating that, in areas such as general health
care regulation, "state action is not preempted so long as it does not duplicate the causes
of action listed in ERISA section 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)]"); Trueman, supra
note 99, at 443 (acknowledging rule set forth in Roark).
192 See Matthew Cross, The Fifth CircuitProvides a Reproducible Frameworkfor the
Application of the Complete Preemption Doctrine, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 208 (1998)
(expressing reluctance of courts to declare that federal statute has extraordinary
preemptive force required for court to declare it completely preemptive, and noting that,
in rare cases, court may determine federal law "completely" preempts plaintiffs statebased claims, converting plaintiffs state law claims to federal claims even for purposes of
removal jurisdiction).
193 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 305 n.6 (noting that "ERISA § 514(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a)] preempts 'all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to an
employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title."'); see also Cal. Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 322 n.3 (1987) (recognizing preemptive effect of ERISA § 514(a)
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statutory tort created by the Texas Health Care Liability Act)
that fall outside § 1132(a), even though preempted by §1144,
follow the "well-pleaded complaint rule and do not confer original
or removal jurisdiction,"194 requiring such claims to be heard in
The court's finding that the decisions made
state courts.
regarding the treatment of Calad and Davila were 'mixed
eligibility' 19 5 (after analyzing the facts in light of the Pegram
holding and noting that fiduciaries, after Pegram, do not make
mixed eligibility decisions) illustrates that §1132(a)(2) cannot
completely preempt their personal injury claims under the Texas
Health Care Liability Act.196
Section 1132(a)(1)(B) allows a plan participant or beneficiary to

bring a civil action "to recover benefits due him under the terms
of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan."19 7 Federal courts have held in the past that § 1132(a)(1)(B)

creates a claim for breach of contract when a decision is made by
198
a plan administrator construing the terms of the plan.
[currently 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)]). See generally Cynthia Ransburg-Brown, The Ultimate
Jigsaw Puzzle: ERISA Preemption and Liability in the Utilization Review Process, 28
CUMB. L. REV. 403, 420 (1998) (observing that, "[clurrently, the Supreme Court appears to
be interpreting ERISA preemption using ordinary conflict preemption or complete
preemption").
194 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 305 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 at 23-27 (1983)).
195 See id. at 307-08 (determining that Calad's and Davila's claims did not present
"simple yes-or-no coverage questions," but rather "the type of 'when and how' medical
necessity questions... that fall within Pegram's rule").
196 See id. at 311 (using Rush Prudentialas tool to narrow Pilot Life's expansive test
of complete preemption: states may not duplicate causes of action listed in ERISA § 502(a)
[currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)], and THCLA does not provide action for collecting benefits,
so, therefore, it is not preempted by § 502(a)(1)(B) [currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)]
under Pilot Life). See generally Richard D. Leigh, Physician Incentives and ERISA
Fiduciary Liability After Pegram v. Herdrich: What Solutions Are Available to HMO
Patients Harmed by Non-Disclosure of Incentive Compensation Schemes?, 106 DICK. L.
REV. 415, 441 (2001) (recognizing that mixed eligibility decisions are not made by
fiduciaries); Osgood, supra note 20, at 878-79 (noting that, in wake of Pegram, "if a mixed
eligibility decision involves exercising medical judgment, then the decision-maker engages
in the practice of medicine and is subject to state medical board regulation, and the
decision does not fall under ERISA's preemptive shield").
197 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (establishing cause of action to recover benefits under
health care plan).
198 See Jones v. Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004)
(noting that "the remedies explicitly authorized in Section 502(a)(1)(B) [currently 29
US.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)i... are akin to common law breach of contract causes of action");
see, e.g., Gosselink v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph, Inc., 272 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that "[w]hen an ERISA benefits plan provides the plan administrator with
discretionary authority to construe the terms of the Plan, the plan administrator's denial
of benefits is reviewed for abuse of discretion"). See generally Wildbur v. ARCO Chem.
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However, the claims made by Calad and Davila were statutorily
created causes of action based on decisions concerning the
"medical necessity"19 9 of treatment decisions made by their
attending physicians.
Notably, Ruby Calad did not bring suit to force CIGNA to
compensate her for the cost of her emergency treatment, and
Juan Davila did not seek to force Aetna to pay for the medication
it initially refused to cover. 20 0 Lastly, the Roark court assuaged
any doubts it might have had about the potential preemption of
2
state malpractice law by acknowledging Pegram's admonition 01
that "ERISA should not be interpreted to preempt state
malpractice laws or to create a federal common law of medical
malpractice." 20 2 The court declined to issue a holding in Roark
that would do exactly what the Supreme Court properly refused
to do in Pegram.203
V. CONCLUSION
If a physician's own negligence is the proximate cause of injury
to a patient, the patient may bring a tort claim against that
physician for medical malpractice, recovering damages in varying
forms for the resulting personal injury. 2 04 If a patient purchases
Co., 974 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1992), modified, 979 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1992)
(highlighting that "a denial of benefits challenged under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), is reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan gives the
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan").
199 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 309 (noting Calad's and Davila's assertion of tort claims:
"they have not sued their ERISA plan administrator, nor do they challenge his
interpretation of the plan"); see also Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000)
(defining mixed decisions as more common, such as "whether one treatment option is
superior... and needed so promptly, that a decision to proceed would meet the medical
necessity requirement").
200 See Roark, 307 F.3d at 302 (noting that both patients sought damages from
respective HMOs involved).
201 See id. at 311.
202 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236-37.
203 Compare Roark, 307 F.3d at 311(holding ERISA § 502(a) [currently 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)] did not completely preempt the plaintiffs' state claims since Section 502(a)(2)
[currently 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)] did not address claims against HMOs that were not
acting as plan fiduciaries in denying medical treatment), with Pegram, 530 U.S. at 23637 (refusing to apply ERISA since mixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not
fiduciary decisions under ERISA); see also Trueman, supra note 99, at 443 (highlighting
that, in Roark, "[tihe Fifth Circuit relied on Pegram and identified the plaintiffs' claims as
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions subject to state medical malpractice law").
204 See Christopher Vaeth, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice
Action, 35 A.L.R.5th 145, 2a (2004) (noting that "[iut is the general rule that one who has
been injured by the negligence of a physician or a surgeon in the course of treatment is
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health insurance for himself and his family from an MCO
(entirely unrelated to his employment), and the MCO itself
employed the physician, the patient would have a vicarious
liability claim against the MCO.205 If that same patient was the

victim of a negligent treatment decision made by a physician
serving as a "utilization reviewer" 206 employed by the MCO
rather than by the primary care physician, the patient would
have a direct liability claim for negligence against the MCO.207 If
a state legislature passed a law requiring the external review of
any decision made regarding the medical necessity of a

physician-recommended treatment, 208 the patient has a cause of
action against an MCO for damages when that MCO fails to
209
provide her with such a state-mandated review.
entitled to recover compensatory damages"); see, e.g., Lisa Petrilli, Lost Chance In
Illinois? That May Still Be The Case, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 250 (2002)
(highlighting that "[i]n order to have a medical negligence claim in Illinois, the plaintiff
must show that the doctor had a duty, that the doctor breached that duty, and that the
breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injury"). See generally Barberito v. Western
Queens Community Hosp., 707 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (stating that "[a]
medical malpractice cause of action may be based on allegations that a physician
negligently gave advice to his patient as to what course of treatment to pursue").
205 See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237 (holding that plaintiff had stated claim against MCO
that employed her physician who negligently failed to order test that could have
prevented her appendix from rupturing); see also Ochmann, supra note 46, at 605 (noting
that "[s]ome federal courts have held MCOs vicariously liable for a physician's negligence
under the doctrines of respondeat superior and ostensible agency"). See generally Dorros,
supra note 69, at 391 (highlighting that "[niot until recently have courts imposed liability
on MCOs for the negligence of the physicians whom they employed or with whom they
contracted").
206 See Ochmann, supra note 46, at 612 n146.
207 See Russell Korobkin, The FailedJurisprudenceof Managed Care, and How to Fix
It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 459 (2003) (stating that if
negligent treatment decisions were made by physician serving as "utilization reviewer"
for MCO rather than by primary physician, patient would have direct liability claim
against MCO); compare Lyden, supra note 114, at 47 (noting that patient may bring
direct liability claim for negligent utilization review on part of MCO), with Fehn, supra
note 63, at 512 (noting that patient may only hold HMO vicariously liable for negligent
acts of member physicians and must, therefore, establish that physician was acting as
agent for HMO").
208 See Lori K. Amano, Erisa and Federal Preemption Following Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran. Preemptive Effects Felt in Hawaii, 25 HAWAII L. REV. 593,605 (2003)
(highlighting that "[aipproximately forty states have enacted independent review laws
that provide for independent or external review of an MCO's denial of a treating
physician's medical necessity decision"); see also Supreme Court to Decide Extent of Health
Care Plan Liability, MED. MAL. L. & STRATEGY, Jan. 8, 2004, at 5 (stating at present,
Arizona, California, Georgia, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Washington and West Virginia allow patients to sue health plans that deny
coverage for physician-recommended treatments); see, e.g., Illinois Health Maintenance
Organization Act, 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (2000) (providing for statutorily
mandated review of service proposed by primary care physician but denied by HMO).
209 See Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 363 (2002) (holding that
plaintiff had cause of action under Illinois statute that mandated independent external

2005]

ERISA PREEMPTIONJURISPRUDENCE

However, if this same patient were the beneficiary of an ERISA
plan through the course of his employment, the result would be
strikingly different. 2 10 That patient, who relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Pilot Life, has suffered as a result of a
physician's (or otherwise medically trained utilization reviewer's)
negligence and, up until now, had no possibility of recourse. 2 11 In
some federal courts, the patient is caught in the inequitable
regulatory vacuum where state law tort and contract actions are
preempted by ERISA, and yet ERISA provides no remedy to
redress the injury the plaintiff has suffered. 2 12 It is entirely true
that jury awards in personal injury and medical malpractice

review by unaffiliated physician in case recommended treatment, as well as external
review, were denied by HMO); see also Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed
Care Liability: Reflections on Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental
Reform, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 253, 260 (2001) (noting that "[without ERISA preemption,
it is fair to say that all managed care organizations would be subject to state common law
liability to their patients, as are other insurers and corporations"). But see Agrawal ,
supra note 128, at 236 (stating that "it is undeniable that ERISA has significantly
restricted the abilities of plan beneficiaries to seek damages for the conduct of managed
care organizations, including medical necessity decisions, medical management policies,
or other coverage determinations that affect the care received by a beneficiary").
210 See Frank J. Vandall, An Examination Of The Duty Issue In Health Care
Litigation:Should HMOs be Liable In Tort For "Medical Necessity" Decisions?, 71 TEMPLE
L. REV. 293, 310 (1998) (highlighting that ERISA beneficiaries, whose benefits are
typically funded by employers, may not bring state suit for failure to review physician's
medical necessity claim, because such claims are preempted by federal ERISA guidelines
for grievance procedures and judicial review); see also Churchill, supra note 113, at 561
(stating that "the legislative intent and the public policies behind ERISA support a
determination that state laws requiring independent review of medical necessity decisions
are ultimately preempted by ERISA"). But see Jackonis, supra note 29, at 218-19
(highlighting proposed legislation that would ensure ERISA does not preempt state cause
of action arising from an insurer's determination of medical necessity).
211 See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that Pilot Life asserts principle that ERISA preempts state law claims alleging
improper handling of benefit claims); see also Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937,
942 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting malpractice claim as preempted against utilization review
decision because defendants "were determining what benefits were available.., under
the plan"); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that "where the state
law has the effect of creating a qualitative standard.., by which the performance of the
contract is evaluated, then that state law is completely preempted").
212 See Shannon Turner, ERISA Preemption of Direct Liability Claims: Texas Throws
Down the Gauntlet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 211, 216 (1999) (highlighting that ERISA creates
tremendous barrier to recovery for employees who have self-insured, employer-provided
health benefit plans and wish to sue for negligent delay or denial of treatment because
ERISA preempts state law claim against HMO for negligent utilization review decision
and plaintiff has no alternative remedy under ERISA). See generally Martin V. Klein,
Quality v. Quantity. Will ERISA Preemption Survive The Third Circuit Test In Re U.S.
Healthcare, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1069, 1103 (2001) (noting that "[g]enerally courts find
that ERISA preempts any direct negligence claim regarding utilization review that result
from a denial of benefits"); Mariner, supra note 88, at 1986 (discussing ERISA's lack of
substantive regulation and obstruction of certain state regulation).
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cases have steadily risen. 2 13 However, the often-cited policy
argument espousing the need for cost containment does not
overcome the need for redress to injured plaintiffs. 2 14 It certainly
does not overcome the need for a constitutionally mandated
holding by the Supreme Court 2 15 that claims of state common
law (or statutory) medical malpractice were not intended to be
preempted by ERISA.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in
these cases, most discussion of congressional inaction and ERISA
reform has seemingly fallen by the wayside. 2 16 However, there is
nothing preventing Congress from creating new legislation or
amending ERISA in order to clarify the now virtually
dichotomous body of law. Unfortunately, partisan bickering has
213 See Michael D. Brophy, Multi-Million Dollar Verdicts: Time for a Second Opinion,
MED. MALPRACTICE LAW & STRATEGY, May 30, 2004, at 1 (discussing significant number
of seven and eight figure verdicts returned over past decade in medical malpractice cases);
Sally Peters, Physicians ConcernedAbout Situation as MalpracticePremiums Continue to
Rise, FAM. PRAC. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2002, at 1 (noting median medical malpractice jury
award more than doubled between 1994 and 1999, rising from $375,000 to $800,000,
according to Jury Verdict Research, Horsham, PA); Tillinghast Finds Nation's Tort Costs
Increase by 13.3% in 2002, LiAB. & INS. WEEK, Dec. 15, 2003 (commenting on record jury
awards in medical malpractice cases in recent years).
214 See Catherine M. Hedgeman, The Rationing of Medicine: Herdrich v. Pegram, 10
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 305, 322 (2000) (arguing standard of medical expertise is different
from standard of resource-use allocation, which must be variable standard.); Alissa J.
Rubin, Justices to Hear Challenge to HMO Shield: Health Case is One of Several Involving
Responsibility for Injuries to Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A14 (stressing
importance of rulings in ERISA preemption cases, noting that "MCOs viewed the lower
court's ruling as potentially harmful to the industry because it could undermine many
plans' arrangements for controlling costs and providing standard patient care"); see also
Ochmann, supra note 46, at 604 (calling cost-containment mechanisms "the very heart of
managed care organizations' success").
215 See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 02-1845) (granting petition for
writ of certiorari from United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit); Roark v.
Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, CIGNA HealthCare of Texas,
Inc. v. Calad , 124 S. Ct. 463 (Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-83) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari from United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit); see also Supreme Court
to Decide if HMOs May Be Sued in State Court, supra note 3 (noting underlying facts of
companion cases and quoting lower courts' holdings).
216 See generally Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Court to Review Suits
on H.MO. Policies, NY TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at 18 (highlighting significance of Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari to decide whether HMOs can be sued for damages for refusing
to cover necessary medical treatment in light of congressional deadlock over patients'
rights and absence of new federal legislation addressing evolution of managed care);
Dennis Kelly, Supreme Court Agrees To Hear HMO Lawsuit Cases, BESTWIRE, Nov. 4,
2003 (arguing Davila and Calad cases present opportunity for Supreme Court to clarify
role of health plan administrative decisions as covered under ERISA); Gary Young, HMO
Suits: All Smell Final Victory; Pre-Emption Issue Again at High Court, NAT'L LAW
JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2003, at 1 (noting expectations riding on Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Davila and Calad to clarify questions regarding ERISA's pre-emption of
state-law claims).
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stalled the enactment of federal legislation to potentially resolve
ERISA's inequitable preemption of claims. 2 17 Supporters of a
Federal Patients' Bill of Rights advocate congressional action
forcing MCOs to take responsibility for their incredible breadth
of authority in medical decision-making, 218 while compensating
malpractice victims whose claims would otherwise be preempted
by ERISA.219 As a result of Congress' failure to clarify ERISA's
complicated and poorly drafted preemption provisions, the
Supreme Court is again faced with the task of retrospectively
22
analyzing antiquated congressional 'intent.' 0
It seems clear that Congress, in 1974, did not intend to
preempt the most ordinary state law tort claims in the hopes of
217 See Laura B. Benko, Final Appeal; High Court to Rule Over Right to Sue for
Failure to Cover Doctor-Ordered Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 18
(acknowledging legislative void left last year when House and Senate deadlocked on
supra note 216, at 18 (noting that
federal patients' bill of rights); Greenhouse,
congressional deadlock over patients' rights and absence of new federal legislation
addressing evolution of managed care since 1974 have made ERISA, due to its broad and
confusing language preempting some state laws, focus of litigation); David S. Senoff,
Recent Ruling is Bad News for Bad Faith Litigation, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 27,
2004, at 5 (noting that although "Congress could simply act to amend or clarify the
preemptive effect of ERISA, given the politics involved in passing such legislation and the
current climate of tort reform at all levels of government, that result is unlikely").
218 See generally Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA
Preemption in the Age of Managed Care, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 433, 436-40 (1998)
(advocating creation of enterprise liability system); Robert A. Clifford, High Court
Decision Keeps Patientsfrom Suing HMOs, CHI. LAWYER, Aug. 2004, at 23 (quoting Sen.
Edward Kennedy, supporter of Federal Patients' Bill of Rights, "'[w]hen HMOs make
medical decisions that injure or kill patients, they should be held accountable'); No Right
to Sue, INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL, June 23, 2004, at A12 (arguing it is time to enact
Federal Patients' Bill of Rights to make managed care providers as accountable as doctors
they manage).
219 See Carter, supra note 13, at 561 (advocating Patients' Bill of Rights that would
hold HMOs accountable, contain legal and medical costs and allow malpractice victims to
be duly compensated); Clifford, supra note 218, at 23 (quoting Sen. Edward Kennedy,
supporter of Federal Patients' Bill of Rights, "under current law, HMOs can escape
accountability for their harmful conduct. Congress must act to correct this injustice by
passing a patients' bill of rights that will allow seriously injured patients to seek
compensation from the HMOs that caused their injuries"); A Free Ride For HMOs; There's
Still Time For Congress to Enact a Patient'sBill of Rights, NEWSDAY, June 24, 2004, at
A44 (arguing federal patients' bill of rights is necessary due to Supreme Court's decision
preventing patients from suing managed-care plans for damages that result when they
deny treatment, even when decision amounts to medical judgment).
220 See Greenhouse, supra note 216, at 18 (noting that, in their appeals, Aetna and
CIGNA called on Supreme Court to correct mistake of lower court in ignoring statute's
language and Supreme Court precedents that made it clear Congress intended ERISA
breach-of-contract remedy to be exclusive, not supplemented by state remedies). See
generally Clifford, supra note 218, at 23 (noting that antiquated laws no longer protect
patients); Pillsbury & Levinson Warns Consumers of a Federal Law that Restricts
Recovery of Insurance Benefits, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 17, 2003 (quoting Arnold Levinson
stating "ERISA is one of the worst and most poorly understood laws ever passed by
Congress" and that "Congress is failing to protect the rights of working Americans by
refusing to adequately address and reform the inherent flaws of ERISA").
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containing rising damage awards threatening HMOs and MCOs
which, in fact, were in their infant stages at that time. 2 2 1 If the
Court does rule as expected based on the recent decisions in
Pegram and Rush, both narrowing the previously enormous
breadth of the preemption clause, MCOs operating nationwide
will be faced with the overwhelming task of obeying a variety of
different state laws. However, these proposed and enacted laws,
such as the Texas Health Care Liability Act, are not regulatory
in nature. 22 2 The only state law that MCOs and their utilization
reviewers may now be compelled to obey, by a decision in favor of
Davila and Calad, is the law prohibiting negligence in the
practice of medicine. 2 23 If the legal framework of the states
creates an unbearable burden on MCOs, then MCOs are clearly
incapable, as a class, of making medical decisions best left to
treating physicians.
* Notably, this article was authored in advance of the Supreme Court's
decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004), where it
was held that the beneficiaries' causes of action fell within the scope of
221 See generally Clifford, supra note 218, at 23 (noting that ERISA predates dawn of
managed care and entirely different way in which health-care decisions are made); Senoff,
supra note 217, at 5 (arguing that "ERISA has evolved into a shield that insulates HMOs
from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against plan
beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress.");
Young, supra note 216, at 1 (stating that patient rights advocates argue that ERISA,
which was enacted before managed care became norm, must make room for state-law
remedies because it does not adequately protect rights of participants).
222 See Lyden, supra note 114, at 43-47 (describing nature of the Texas Health Care
Liability Act); see also Out of Order, TEX. LAWYER, Nov. 10, 2003, at 33 (noting '"Texas is
one of 14 states that allow patients to sue their HMOs, although insurance companies
often argue that ERISA pre-empts the state law"). See generally Janice G. Inman,
Supreme Court Deals Blow to MalpracticePlaintiffs, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY,
July 30, 2004, at 1 (explaining ERISA is meant to provide uniform regulatory regime over
employee benefit plans and, accordingly, any state-law cause of action that duplicates,
supplements, or supplants ERISA civil enforcement remedy is preempted).
223 See Julie Appleby, Patients' Fight for Right to Sue Insurers Goes to Top Court,
USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2004, at 9B (stating that question before Supreme Court in Davila
and Calad is whether patients should be able to sue insurers for medical negligence);
Robert A. Clifford, High Court to Review Patients'Right to Sue, CHI. LAWYER, Feb. 2004,
at 16 (arguing that, at very least, Supreme Court's decision in Davila and Calad will
"offer some guidelines on challenging managed care organizations' decisions when
negligence occurs involving the eligibility questions under a plan, the appropriateness of a
treatment and the delivery of care, and what happens when these elements intermingle");
Marcia Coyle, High Court to Weigh HMO Suits, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 8, 2004, at 4
(noting Supreme Court in Davila and Calad will decide whether HMOs can be sued in
state courts for negligence and medical malpractice, resolving current split among circuits
as to whether state law claims against HMOs for negligence or medical malpractice are
pre-empted by ERISA).

20051

ERISA PREEMPTIONJURJSPRUDENCE

(and, as such, were completely pre-empted by) § 502(a)(1)(B), and thus
were removable to a District Court. Justice Thomas, writing for a
unanimous Court, noted that duties imposed by the state statute in the
context of these beneficiaries' cases did not arise independently of ERISA
or the plan terms, as:
(1) A managed-care entity could not be subject to liability under the state
statute if the entity denied coverage for any treatment not covered by the
health care plan that it was administering.
(2) The beneficiaries' causes of action were not entirely independent of the
federally-regulated plan contracts.
(3) The beneficiaries (i) had brought suit only to rectify a wrongful denial
of benefits promised under ERISA-regulated plans, and (ii) were not
attempting to remedy any violation of a legal duty independent of ERISA.
The crux of this paper is embodied by Justice Ginsburg's concurrence,
joined by Justice Breyer, expressing the view that Congress and the
Supreme Court ought to revisit what was an unjust and increasingly tangled
ERISA regime, "as the court's coupling of an encompassing interpretation
of ERISA's pre-emptive force with a cramped construction of the 'equitable
relief allowable under § 502(a)(3) had created a regulatory vacuum in
which (1) virtually all state-law remedies were pre-empted, but (2) very
few federal substitutes were provided.

